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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Several theorists in the area of interorganizational analysis
focused on the distinction between the "vertically-oriented"organization (where the authority runs downward from the federal or
state to local level, and where the vast bulk of resources are
controlled by a parent agency), and the "horizontally-oriented"
organization (where the authority runs horizontally among a particular
network of organizations).

The intent of their inquiry has been to

illustrate the problems associated with the vertically-oriented
organization in terms of service deli very within a particular network
of organizations.

For instance, Burton Gummer, in his study of the

interorganizational relationships of a public welfare agency, found
that vertically-oriented organizations would have little involvement
with other organizations in its functional and geographic environment
because of its dependence upon a parent body for the supply of
virtually all of its resources (Gummer, 1974).

Because the

vertically-oriented organization is dependent upon the parent agency
for its survival, it will be more concerned with internal affairs, and
thus Ie s sconce rned with inte rorganizational acti vitie s.

2

Sol Levine and Paul White, in their study of community health
organizations, concluded that local member units of verticallyorie nted organizations, because they are less dependent upon the
health system, and can obtain resources outside the system, interact
less with other local organizations than horizontally-oriented organizations (Levine and White, 1961).

This study also pointed out that

this independence from the rest of the local health system and
greater dependence upon a system outside the community causes
specific types of disagreement among the local system.
Finally, Levine, White, and Paul in their study of 68 voluntary health care agencies in four communities, point out that
vertically-oriented organizations with local chapters or affiliates
are limited or circumscribed by priorities established by national
bodies.

By contrast, organizations such as the Community Chest and

the United Fund (both horizontally-oriented organizations) are geared
to the local community.

Given the diverse sources of authority it is

understandable that maximal inter-agency cooperation is not always
attained (Levine, White, and Paul, 1963).
All of these studies have documented a structural explanation
of the cause of interorganizational coordination.

Namely, the organ-

izations' capacity to engage in interorganizational acti vitie s will be a
function of its location vis-a-vis its major providers of resources.
Those organizations located in a vertically-oriented, corporate
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structure will tend to interact less with other organizations in a
particular functional or geographic community causing a serious
problem of fragmentation in the delivery of services.
Given this perspective, the current trend in domestic national
policy toward decentralization of policy-setting and decision-making
to local levels of government (the "new federalism") can be expected
to worsen the already high degree of fragmentaion in service delivery
systems.

The traditional approach to program integration in the

past has been the guidelines surrounding the granting of federal funds
to the states and localities.

These guidelines have always placed a

high priority on program coordination and integration as a condition
for the receipt of funds.

The "new federalism," despite its attempt

to support the devolution of power to state and local governments,
has also placed a high priority on integration and coordination as a
condition for the receipt of federal dollars.

To the extent that the

"new federalism" pursues a strategy of "no strings" attched funds,
then one can expect the kind of internally-oriented behavior that
characterizes the vertically-oriented organization to persist.
Thi's study will focus on a particular program (The Area
Agency on Aging) which was developed in response to the problems
of fragmentation among the service delivery system for the aging.
In so doing, two very important questions will be answered:
1.

To what extent does the characteristics of the Area Agency on
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Aging reseITlble a vertically-oriented organization?

2.

To what

extent does the Area Agency on Aging gear its activities toward
the coordination of services for the elderly?

The basic assumption

is that because the Area Agency on Aging resembles another
vertically-oriented organization, its main focus of attention will be
on internal concerns (i. e.,
acti vitie s.

survival) rather than interorganizational

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE ON
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR

The model used in this description of vertical and horizontal
organizations is an open systems perspective which focuses on a
network of organizations in interaction with its environment.

As

Howard Aldrich (1973) has pointed out, the major difference between
this approach and more traditional approaches to organizational
analysis is that, 1) it places a greater concern on factors making for
internal or intra organizational conflict and variation as opposed to
an emphasis on internal cooperation and stability, and 2) it emphasizes turnover and conflict within a network of organizations rather
than studying a particular unit-set. 1

This approach illustrates the

difference between interorganizational analysis and organizational
analysis in that it starts out with the assumption that conflict is a
given, and the elimination of this conflict is a deviant instance and
likely to lead to a disruption of interorganizational relations (Litwak

1A network has been defined as If • • • consisting of all the
groups and organizations as well as the consumers associated with
a particular production system designed to service some customer
or client. II (Hage, 1975: p. 212)
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and Hylton, 1972). It stresses the operation of social behavior under
conditions of partial conflict and the factors which are equally
derived from all units of the interaction rather than being differentially weighed by authority structure.
By stressing the fact that the environment makes conflicting
demands on the organization, internal variation becomes essential
if organizations are to respond to environmental changes.

Many

available contributers to a theory of organizational structure do not
incorporate the direct source of variation in formal structural
arrangements, i. e., the strategic decision of those who have the
power of structural initiation.

A theoretical incorporation of the

decision-making process within a particular organization has

su~gested

that,
..• constraints upon structural choice are
weakened in their effect to the extent that
the decision-maker perceive that the design
of the organization t s structure only has a
limited effect on performance levels
achieved. (Child, 1972)
This is due in part to the contextual constraints facing the organization.

Despite the fact that they perceive structural design to have

some impact upon performance levels, the dominant coalition (or
organizational decision-makers) within the organization may be in a
position to institute modifications to the context in order to maintain
a preferred structure without harm to the performance level.
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However, if the organizational decision-makers perceive the structure
as posing certain performance implications they may prefer to
"satisfice": to trade-off some potential gain in performance for a
congenially structured mode of operation

(Child, 1972).

Con-

sequently, they may have some choice over performance standards.
In the open- systems model, the exercise of strategic choice
can be defined as "the determination of basic long-term goals and
objectives of an enterprise, the adoption of a course of action, and the
allocation of resources necessary for carrying out these goals tI

,

(Chandler, 1962: p. 13). It is important to note here that the
decision-makers prior ideology will color this evaluation to some
degree.

Structure, in turn, can be defined as "the design of the

organization through which the organization is administered II
(Chandler, 1962: p. 14). As Alfred Chandler (1962) has shown in his
study of four major corporations in the United States, "structure
follows strategy, and that complex types of structure is the result
of the concatenation of several basic strategies I I ' (Chandler, 1962: p.14).
Those aspects of the organization's variability which approximately
map the environment are se1ecti ve1y reinforced through inte rna1 and
external mechanisms.

In terms of internal mechanisms, strategic

action will involve an attempt to establish a configuration of manpower, technology, and structural arrangements which is internally
consistent and consistent with the size and nature of the operations
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planned

(Child, 1972). Internal mechanisms can either be formalized

through a planning process or kept informal through boundary
personnel.

Strategic action with regard to external variables may

include a move into or out of a given market or areas of activity in
order to secure a favorable demand or response that will be expressed by a high valuation of the organization's product or services.
Through the reinforcement of organizational acti vitie s, exte rnal
mechanisms are performed

(Aldrich, 1973). The conjunction of

efficiency (internal) and demand (external) will in the end determine
the organization's overall level of performance.

Organizational C oncep.ts
Organizations in this study will be treated as goal-directed,
boundary maintaining, information processing activity systems.
Within each organization, abstract purposes, charter goals, and the
like come to be translated into ongoing programs

(Benson, 1975).

Once this process has been reached and advanced, the decisionmakers within their perspective organizations are responsible for
expanding their established programs.

Abstract goals then recede

into the background of shared assumptions which are taken for
granted and may be employed for the legitimation of ongoing programs

(Benson, 1975). Other key concepts in this approach include

the idea of task environment, domain, and organizational sub-systems.

9

Task Environment.

James Thompson (1976) has described

the task environment as "those parts of the environment which are
relevant or partially relevant to the goal setting, goal attainment,
survival or effectiveness of the organization If

Richard Hall (1972).

makes a distinction between the general environment (i. e., political
technological, ecological demographic, and cultural) and the specific
environment (or task environment) which he describes as being
composed of the organizations and individuals with which the
organization is in direct interaction.

This raises a question with

regard to the study of interorganizational relations, i. e., to what
extent need the theorist demonstrate a clear link between something
in the organization's en vironment and change in the organization IS
behavior.

The definition of the task environment which this per-

spective takes is defined as " •.. consisting of all parts of the
environment potentially or actually relevant to the organization's
behavior

fI

(Aldrich, 1973: p. 51).

This takes into consideration

the organization's behavior despite its awareness of all parts of
the environment.

Domain.

The domain of the organization is defined as the sub-

set of the task environment and refers to a range of activities claimed
by the organization itself.

The possession of a domain permits the

organization to operate within a specific sphere, claiming support
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for its activities and defining proper practice s within its realm
(Benson, 1975: p. 232).
The in-put domain consists of those points at which the organization is dependent upon inputs from the environment, and can be
broken down into two dimensions.

One is the range of products or

services needed and the technology to obtain them, and the other is
what Roland Warren (1973) defines as the in-put constituency which
consist of,
... those organizations or actors acknowledged
by the organization as supporting, financing,
promoting, providing program material, or
making decisions regarding the functioning of
the organization. (Roland Warren, 1973: pp.
173-174)
The out-put domain consists of those points at which the organization
is dependent upon exchanging its products or services for resources
from the environment.

The out-put constituency consists of those

other organizations acknowledged by the organization as being an
appropriate target for its activities.

Finally, the through-put domain

consists of the points to where the organization is dependent upon its
environment for processing its services

Resources.

(Aldrich, 1973).

In focusing on relationships between organizations,

it is important to determine the elements that flow between organizations and their environment or other organizations.

These elements

will be defined in terms of resources sought after by the organization
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or the units that possess those resources.

Following Yuchtman and

Seashore (1967), it is assumed that organizational decision-makers
are typically oriented to the acquisition and defense of an adequate
supply of resources, and that this orientation determines within
fairly restrictive limits, the nature of interactions both on the service
delivery level and in the performance of mandated functions.
Two types of resources are paramount to this perspective:
money and authority.

Money is of obvious importance to the main-

tenance and the expansion of programs, the recruitITlent of personnel,
and the purchase of buildings and material.

Authority refers to the

legitimation of activities, the rights and responsibility to carry out
programs of a certain kind dealing with a broad problem area of
focus

(Benson, 1975: p. 232).
The assertion that organizations pursue an adequate supply of

nloney and authority leaves a number of questions unanswered.

Many

different actions lUay be cOITlpatible with this broad and general requirement.

J. Kenneth Benson (1975) has addressed this issue by the

elaboration of operational decision criteria governing interagency
relations.

The following are a list of such decision rules: The first

is the fulfillment of prograITl requirements.

The organization IS

claim to an adequate supply of resources (ITloney and authority) will
be based on the adequacy and efficiency of established programs. Thus,
agencies will be reluctant to undertake tasks or tolerate practices of
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other organizations that interfere with the fulfillment of present
programs.

Second is the maintenance of a clear domain of high

social importance.

This criteria is based on the as sumption that

organizations strive for autonomy.

Decision-makers are oriented

to a clear-cut, uncluttered claim. that includes a set of important
activities.

Finally, the third is the extended application and defense

of an agency's paradigm, i. e., agencies are committed to their own
definitions of problems.

According to Benson, (1975) organizations

taki ng othe r approac he s constitute an implicit threat to the flow of
authority and money into an organization.

CHAPTER III

ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXTS

Many organizational theorists have focused to a considerable
degree on the impact that certain contextual factors (factors suc h as
origin and history, dependency, interorganizational relations, etc.)
have on the structure and performance level of an organization.
Pugh, et aI, (1969) in their study of several British industrial firms,
found that certain contextual factors had a direct bearing on the
structure of an organization.

For example, they found that older

organizations tend to be more decentralized.

Furthermore, Blau

and Schoenherr (1971), in their study of employment agencies throughout the country, found that the size of an organization had a tremendous amount of correlation with certain structural variables.

Both

of these perspectives, however, are based more on a closed system
perspective.

They do not take into consideration the process of

strategic choice or internal variation among organizations.

The

following section will describe corporate (vertically oriented) as
well as federate (horizontally oriented) organizations in te rms of
how they have responded to and/or adapted to certain contextual
variables.

In so doing, some of the distinguishing features between
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vertical and horizontal-types of organizations will be illustrated.

ORIGIN AND HISTORY

In looking at the history of organizations, the major focus
will not be on origins

p~~,

but on the consequences for organiz-

ational growth and expansion, such as the capacities of the organization to carry out the purposes for which it was established.

This

section, therefore, will focus on the consequences which led to the
development of three distinct kinds of organizations: large scale
business organizations, voluntary organizations, and government
controlled relief-giving organizations.

As will become evident, there

are many similarities between these organizations with regard to the
kinds of environmental and technological constraints facing them
which served to influence the kinds of decisions that were open to
the organizational decision-maker.

What is of particular interest

to this study, however, are the variations between these organizations
in terms of how they responded to these constraints.

These vari-

ations help to further clarify the difference between the verticallyoriented and the horizontally-oriented organization with regard to
their impact on the organizations' level of efficiency and performance.

Busines s Organizations
Alfred D. Chandler (1962), in his book Strategy and Structure,
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mapped out a sort of administrative history of "industrial enterprise"
(large pri vate, profit oriented firms involved in handling goods in
some or all of successive industrial processes) using the rationale of
"strategic choice.

11

The overall thesis of his investigation illustrated

the fact that changes in organizational structure was related to ways
that the enterprise expanded, and that re -organization of the organization were influenced by the state of administrative art in the
United States, i. e., strategic growth resulted from an awareness of
opportunities and needs - created by changing populations, income,
and technology - to employ existing or expanding resources more
profitably

(Chandler, 1962: p. 73). Consequently, by looking at the

ways that these enterprises expanded it will be possible to understand more fully the origin and history of private, profit-making
vertically as well as horizontally-oriented organizations.

Early American Enterprises.

Before 1850 very few American

businesses required a full-time administrator or a clearly defined
administrative structure.

Industrial enterprises were quite small

and generally were family-run and operated.

Those responsible for

the operation handled all the basic activities - economic, administrative, operational, entrapaneurial, etc.

In the agrarian and

comn1.ercial economy of ante-bellum America, business administration as a distinct activity did not exist.

In mining, manufacturing
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and transportation, the general superintendent was in charge of
supervision of the labor force while in larger textile manufacturing
industries, the president or treasurer was in charge of finances and
arranged for the purchasing of activities

(Chandler, 1962).

Yet before the 1850s a few of the largest economic enterprises in the U. S. did develop distinct administrative structure s.
John Jacobs Astor's American Fur
Company, Nicholas Biddle's Second Bank
of the United States, or rather boards of
director s of pri vate corporations that built
the major canals and first railroads and the
state board of public works, all these had
field units and a headquarters.
(Chandler, 1962: p. 15)
For instance, Astor's American Fur Company managed its monopoly
of the fur trading industry in the vast region west of the Mis sis sippi.
The department headquarters managed its out-fits each headed by a
trader

Besides this supervision, they did most of the marketing for

supplies.

Although these were some of the largest enterprises of

their day, the Bank and Fur Company had little impact on the later
development of administrative organization in the large industrial
firms in this country - the Fur Company was virtually dissolved when
Astor withdrew from the partnership.
This distinct administrative structure was particularly
significant in the construction of the Erie Canal and other transportation works during the 1820s and 1830s.

During the construction,
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the line of the canal was divided into a number of divisions, each in
charge of an assistant engineer who was responsible for surveying
the route and then inspecting the progress of the construction.

At the

headquarters a chief engineer supervised the works of the assistants
in the field

(Chandler, 1962). Thus, there was a clear distinction

between the administrative component (a major headquarters) and an
operational component (the field unit).

However, the task of the

organization was more technical than administrative, it was only to
layout the line and then see that the contractors carried out plans.
A board provided the funds and made the major decisions as to the
location.

Until the 1850s the contracting firms which actually built

the transportation works remained small and had little need for
systematic organizational structure since such a contractor rarely
built more than one section of a road at a time

(Chandler, 1962).

He could, therefore, supervise the job himself.

EXp'ansion of Industrial Enterp'rise.

With the completion of

the great east-west trunk lines early in the 1850s, administration
became a full-time task in American business.

The largest enter-

prises in the nation required new methods of management.

They

needed to set up a system where there was a detailed definition of
the line s of authority and communication between headquarters and
the many divisions.

This required a constant flow of reports and
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superintendents who would be responsible for coordinating, appraising,
and planning the work of the ope rating di vi sions.
As the roads grew in m.ileage, and the volum.e of traffic expanded, the num.ber of their adm.inistrative personnel increased and
their operating structure had to be re-defined

(Chandler, 1962).

They spelled out the lines of comm.unication and authority between
the m.aj or and anscilliary units within the transportation departme nt
and also between the transportation and other m.ajor departm.ents
such as traffic and accounting.

This growth and expansion in the

railroads helped to enlarge the market for Am.erican m.anufacturing,
m.ining, and m.arketing firm.s.

The railroads perm.itted and often

required that these enterprises expand and subdi vide their acti vities,
thus calling for specialization and the encouraged use of m.ore com.plex m.achinery.

This spurred further increases in out-put and so

provided another pressure for expansion and continued growth.
In addition to the expansion of the railroad, other environm.ental factors helped to influence the growth of m.ajor industrial
enterprises in the United States.

Between 1840 and 1880, the urban

population grew from. 11 % of the total population in the U. S. to 28% ,
or 4% per decade.

In 1800, the rural population stood at 36 m.illion

and the urban population equaled 14.1 m.illion.

By 1900, the figures

were 45 m.illion (rural) and 30.2 m.illion (urban), and by then agricultural incom.e was estim.ated at only 3,034 m.illion out of a total

19
national private production income of 14,000 million dollars
(Chandler, 1962: p. 23).
In meeting the needs posed by the environmental factors,
many American factories, mining and marketing firms began to expand their domains through vertical integration by multiplying the
volume of out-put and later these enterprises very quickly expanded
through geographic dispersion - they started to buy or build other
units distant from their original locations.

As James Thompson

(1967) has pointed out, in integrating forward an organization acquire s
distribution capacity greater than its out-put.

This requires that the

organization increase its out-put, which the task environment may not
be able to handle.

A strategy for organizations to take when capacity

is in excess of what the task environment can support will be to expand
their domain by increasing the population served.
they expand through geographic dispe rsion

In other words,

(Thompson, 1967). The se

strategies of vertical integration and geographic dispersion had their
beginnings before the depression of the 1870s.

Only afterwards, in

the 1880s and 1890s did the great impersonal corporate enterprises
appear in any numbers in American industry.

The Growth of Corporations.

The large multi-function enter-

prise sprang from two quite different strategies of growth and expansion.

In one strategy a single company began to exp,and and
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integrate by creating its own marketing organization.

In another, a

number of manufacturing companies which had joined together in a
horizontal combination such as a trade association, pool, trust, or
holding company - consolidated their manufacturing activities and
then moved quickly forward into marketing or backwards into purchasing

(Chandler, 1962). This later type was employed by organiz-

ations producing more staple commodities by an older, less complex
technology.

Both strategies, in turn, were in response to a rapidly

growing market due to population growth and the expansion of the
railroad making more accessible certain manufactured goods.

The

more common road to the formation of the vertically integrated industry was by way of "horizontal combination" (the combination of
several di verse manufacturing industries) and consolidation
(Chandler, 1962).
The threat of excess capacity appears to have been the primary
reason to the initial combinations in most American industries.

The

reason for this being that the rapid increase in out-put of small
enterprises exceeded immediate demand.

The market was gutted.

Consequently, these organizations combined in order to control or
limit competition by setting price and production schedules.
However, as Chandler (1962) pointed out, these "equal federations or horizontally-oriented organizations, " in manufacturing industries were short-lived.

Production and price schedules were hard
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to enforce and they failed to employ fully and effe cti vely the exi sting
resources of their members.

Occasionally a federation dissolved

into its original parts, more often it consolidated.

This was more

evident in those organizations troubled by concentration of control.
Administratively, these consolidated structure s provided for
centralized planning, coordination, appraisal, and planning for its'
extended plant and personnel.

A combination became adminis-

trativelya consolidation only after its executive office began to do
more than set prices and production schedules.
The loose alliance of manufacturing firms into a single consolidated organization with central headquarters made possible
economies of scale through standardization in the procurement of
materials

(Chandler, 1962). Moreover, horizontal consolidation and

centralization immediately created much more pressure for vertical
integration than did mere combination.

Coordination and the inability

to build up an industry 1 s own special market through brand names
and advertising, and the development of products more nearly
fitting the needs of the consumer was inhibited by this consolidated
structure.

Consequently, many firms began handling their own pro-

duction and manufacturing.
A s was previously mentioned, threats and othe r defensi ve
reaons played a critical role in stimulating consolidation and integration.

The resulting threat of unemployed resources and price-
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cutting, the need to apply resources effectively to changes in shortte rm. dem.and, and the de sire to as sum.e m.ore satisfactory m.arketing
facilities or to have a certain supply of stocks, raw m.aterials and
other supplies led to this strategy for expansion.
During the 1900s the m.ost dynam.ic and significant organizations becam.e dom.inated by a few vertically integrated enterprises
ope rating in national and often world m.arkets.

Sm.all firm.s re-

m.ained, but to exist they had to rem.ain specialized or m.eet the
needs of a local area

(Chandler, 1962). When the m.anagers of a

"federation" or a com.bination of integrated com.panies decided to coordinate, appraise, and plan system.atically their work, they alm.ost
always consolidated their activities into a single centralized functionally departm.entalized organization.

This rendered com.pliance with

specifications as well as providing a com.m.unication network that
linked all of the facilities involved in the industrial process with the
custom.ers' dem.ands.
The fault with this structure, however, was that very few m.en
were entrusted with a great num.ber of com.plex decisions.

As long as

an enterprise existed in a stable environm.ent, where there were no
changes in sources of raw m.aterials, m.arkets, and production
processes, they could rem.ain centralized.

Where technology,

markets, and sources of supply were changing rapidly, the defects
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of the centralized structure became more obvious 2 (Chandler, 1962).
During the last two decades the growth of the multi-divisional
"decentralized" structure came into existence.
most responsible for this decentralized form.

Diversification was
It increased the level

of complexity of both ope rational and entrapaneurial acti vitie s.

In

other words, if expansion re suIted only in the de velopment of a full
line of goods that continued to use much the same type of resources,
the reorganization of the marketing department so that it had an
office for each major type of customer was usually sufficient.

On the

other hand, where business diversified into totally new lines serving
a variety of people, decentralization emerged.

Conclusions. From this historical account of organizational
expansion as it relates to business enterprises in the U. S., it is
possible to see the environmental and technological influences
affecting the kinds of decisions or strategies that these organizations
took in terms of their structural design.

These strategies made the

transition from a single organization to a combination of integrated
organizations, to a centralized departmentalized consolidated structure, and finally to a multi-divisional decentralized structure.

It is

2For the past half-century most copper, zinc, tobacco,
sugar, banana, and liquor companies have made much the same
product for much the same type of user - they continued to run with
the same centralized, functionally departme ntalized form.
(Chandler, 1962: p. 36)
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also interesting to note the fact that this pattern varies between organizations.

There is no one right way to structure all com.plex

organizations.

Heterogeneity and dynamism. of the environm.ent m.ake

for the scattering of choice am.ong m.any sub-units, but this depends
to a certain degree on the organization's awareness of its effect on
the environm.ent.

Chandler (1962) has pointed out that such organiz-

ations as the National Dairy recentralized when their m.arkets becam.e
m.ore nearly hom.ogeneous due to such factors as urbanization and
industrialization of the nation.

On the other hand, m.any firm.s have

recently decentralized as electronic data processing has increased;
this decreases the tim.e required to acquire knowledge about the
environm.ental fluctuations and plan adjustm.ents.

This illustrates

the fact that not only do organizations adapt to certain environm.ental
constraints, but in m.any instances they are in a position to institute
m.odifications to the context to m.aintain a preferred structure.

It is of particular interest in this study to note the environm.ental and technological factors which influenced the shift from.
a federation to a centralized structure such as com.petition and the
need to standardize m.arketing procedures..

This is not to say that

when an organization is faced with these environm.ental and technological constraints it will autom.atically change in term.s of its
structural design.

Quite the contrary, strategic growth results

from. an awareness by the organizational decision-m.aker of
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opportunities and needs - created by changing populations, income,
and technology to employ existing or expanding resources more
profitably.

Thus, it was this awareness that influenced the strategy

to centralize.

Voluntary Organizations
This section will describe how the history of voluntary organizations of the social service type have been affected by the evolution
of American society and the environmental and technological factors
accompanying this evolution.

Voluntary organizations used in this

description will be defined as "those organizations which have local
affiliates or chapters throughout the country, have membership composed of volunteers, and depend on contributions as their ITlain source
of financing"

(Sills, 1957: p. 14).

As will becoITle evident, changing

social conditions have produced new probleITls thus creating occasions
for the eITlergence of new voluntary organizations and influencing old
ones to change their goals, much like the kinds of changes that the
business organizations as described above went through.

As technical

expertise developed in American life, as the work in the voluntary
organizations becoITle ITlore complex, as the leisure class volunteer
disappeared, the voluntary organization in AITlerica becaITle ITlore
profe s sionalized and specialized.

One way the se organizations adapted

to environITlental constraints, therefore, was to forITl specialized
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units to face a limited range of contigiencie s within a limited set of
constraints

(Thompson, 1967).

The Early Volunteers. In the colonial period, the natural
hazards of living made necessary a code of ethics that placed emphasis on industriousness and thrift, and which equated poverty and
moral weakness with sin.

We can trace our attitudes toward the

rights and responsibilities of individual members in our society to
these moral judgments which place a premium on independence and
self-help.
It was not until the revolution and the corning of the industrial

revolution that social welfare institutions were created to correct
"social evils"

(Seider, 1960: p. 5). As mentioned previously, this

period marked a time of rapid growth in the population, and the
change in migration patterns.

People were moving to the cities in

response to industrial growth and labor demands.

The problems

associated with these environmental influences awakened moral consciousness and resulted in efforts to reform the individual and
society.
The first volunteers belonged to the social class of industrialists and bankers who were influenced, to a certain extent, by
religion.

This group of people truly started the first charitable

organizations in America, where emphasis was placed on Jlthe wise
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giving of charity"

(Seider, 1960: p. 5). Consequently, these first

agencies grew out of personal interests of these wealthy individuals,
and were inspired by local concerns or by growing national movements.

Such organizations as the Children's Aid Society (forIned in

1883 for the purpose of placing vagrant boys and girls with families
in rural districts), the Young Men's Christian Association (this was
originally developed for the purpose of placing boys in urban faInilies),
hOllles for unwed mothers, and such organizations as the B'nai
B'rith

(Sneider, 1966, p. 6).
During the Civil War, the institutionalization of charity was

further developed as people were encouraged to support agencies
rather than giving personal charity.
public agencies began to emerge.

In SOIne progressive states

These agencies set up welfare

boards to stir indifference of church m.embers to the terrible conditions of the poor in institutions.

However, public aid was still

neglected as private agencies began to flourish

(Seider, 1960).

In

1882, New York had approximately 194 private agencies giving
relief

(Seider, 1966). These agencies, in turn, operated on an

uncoordinated basis.

This created serious probleIns of duplication

of services and inter-agency conflict.

The Charity Organization

Society of New York was established as a central registration to
avoid duplication of services and to encourage inter-agency cooperation.

These agencies had yet to com.bine into federations despite
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this effort to coordinate, appraise, and plan services on a statewide
basis.

The 1900s and the EXp'ansion of the Voluntary...Qr.ganization.
With the great improvement in economic conditions in the early
1900s, social reformers saw, in abundance, an opportunity to
alle viate inadequate living conditions through a redistribution of
wealth.

The concern of people from all classes of society turned to

the effect of low wages, child labor, and poor working conditions.
Consequently, various private voluntary organizations began to
flourish such as the YMCA, labor unions, federations of women's
clubs, etc. (Seider, 1966). Citizen input made for a general understanding and involvement.
As these groups of citizens began to organize, the community
became bewildered by the complexity of services and annoyed by the
demands for contributions . . Not only were these agencies providing
family child welfare, rec reation, informal education, health and
hospitals, mental health, and prison reform, but they were under the
auspices of religious, non-sectarian, and public agencies.

In order

to bring order to chaos, the development of social planning emerged
calling for joint consideration and coordination

(Seider, 1966).

From Pittsburgh's first council of social agencies (1908) and
Cleveland's federated fund raising body, the concept of coordination
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and integration of services, joint planning by agencies for new services, and federated efforts at fund raising gained impetus

(Seider,

1966). The growth in population and technological complexity combined with the chaos as mentioned above, competition, and inte ragency conflict helped to influence these organizations to horizontally
combine.

Moreover, being that the primary responsibility for fund

raising became more of a cross-section of the community, the control
of the wealth shifted to more community control.

All of this taken

together, marked a shift to more of a horizontal line of control among
the se voluntary organizations.

The Threat of War.

In the development of voluntary organiz-

ations the move toward horizontal combination as a way of mobilizing
community support became particularly apparent during World War 1.
At this time two national organizations were formed: the American
Association of Community Funds
the United war activities fund

and Councils of America Inc., and

(Seider, 1966). The latter brought to-

gether seven national agencies to establish a joint national budget,
and to assign quotas to be raised by local war chests.

This movement

helped to expand the number of war chests throughout the country.

It

was also the first time that national board members and business
leaders engaged in a national planning effort affecting local community
services on a coordinated basis.

Here is an example of a horizontally-
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oriented organization where the authority is delegated upwards and
where the decision-making rested entirely on the agreem.ent am.ong
the parties.

This can be dem.onstrated by the fact that this organiz-

ation was created by a group or people meeting together and appointing
officers to act in the name of the organization, a distinguishing
feature of a horizontally-oriented organization

(Sills, 1957). In other

words, the circumstances under which this organization was created
most clearly demonstrate s the direction in which the delegation of
authority took place.
World War I witnessed another major development in the expansion of volunteer services under the American National Red Cross,
organization fir st in 1881.

The initial objective of this organization,

as set forth in its original constitution, was
... to hold itself in readiness in the event of
war or any calamity great enough to be considered
national, to inaugurate such practical measures
in mitigation of such suffering, and for the protective of relief of the sick and the wounded as
may be consistent with the objecti ves of the
Association. (Sills, 1957: p. 262)
The American Red Cross started out very sm.all in its early years,
and flooding and disasters, the Spanish American War, and most
importantly, World War I provided sufficient resources to make any
expansion of its objectives unnecessary.

The strategy for expansion,

in turn, during World War I took the form of "vertical integration. "
It began to contract out professional services to public welfare
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agencies in more than 3, 000 communities throughout the country
(Seider, 1966). This is an example of a strategy where a single organization begins to expand and integrate by creating its own se rvice
organizations.

This type of expansion also illustrates a more

vertically- oriented type of organization where authority is being
delegated downward.
After World War I this organization continued to expand, yet
this occurred without any objective.
also began to decline.

Membership in the organization

As James Thompson (1967) has stated, "multi-

component organizations subject to rationality norms will seek to
grow until the least reducible component is approximately fully
occupied."

In integrating forward, much like the example of the

American Red Cross, an organization has acquired distribution
greater than its capacity.

Sometimes the task environment cannot

handle increased out-put.

Thus, "Organizations with capacity in

excess of what the task environment supports will seek to expand their
domain"

(Thompson, 1967). The American Red Cross expanded its

domain by the adoption of a new program, "the preservation and improvement of Public Health"

(Sills, 1957: p. 262). It became in-

volved in giving relief during the beginnings of the depression of the
"30s.
The prosperous years between World War I and the depression
of the thirties was marked by a push toward specialization and
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professionalization more than the expansion of programs.

In the

traditional family and child agencies, volunteers were being excluded
from direct contact with the client and were relegated to clerical
tasks or to service on boards and committees

(Seider, 1966). Be-

cause the task environment became more heterogeneous producing
greater constraints for the organization, these organizations began
to put boundaries around the scope of adaptation necessary by setting up
specialized units.

This enabled them to face a limited set of contingen-

cies within a limited set of constraints

(Thompson, 1967).

The Consolidation of the Voluntary..Q1:ganization.

The dis-

asterous depres sion years of the thirtie s served to consolidate many
voluntary organizations and to set and raise standards of voluntee r
work.

Standardization as a mechanism for coordination of services

became even more pronounced.

These agencies which were prin-

cipally responsible for clarifying these roles consisted of national
organizations such as the Association of Junior Leagues of America,
the National Council of Jewish Women, the Family Welfare Association of America, the National League for Public Health Nursing, etc.
(Seider, 1966). Through these agencies specific opportunities for
volunteers in the health and welfare field were defined, and principles
for supervising were worked out.

The National Committee on Volun-

teers in social work brought together social workers and volunteers
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to stimulate and improve volunteer service.

This was accomplished

locally through the organization of the volunteer bureaus, most of
which formed a part or affiliated with the local council of social
agencies

(Seider, 1966). These bureaus, in turn, are the proto-type

of the horizontally-oriented organization.

They are examples of

partnerships or coalitions of independent agencies on whose goodwill
and support they depend

(Perlman and Gurin, 1972).

The advances made in defining the role of the volunteer in
depression times were tested and even further defined during World
War II.

The creation of the Office of Ci vilian Defense (OCD) influenced

the disbandment of the independent Committee on Volunteers in social
work.

The job of coordinating became a more centralized task during

war-ti:me.

This organization helped to coordinate the 4, 300 civilian

defense volunteer officers who had the responsibility for manning the
protective and community war services.

Most services in the social

welfare field which were called upon to expand services to meet the
needs of youth, women, the elderly, and handicapped workers pressed
into wartime employment

(Seider, 1966).

In 1944, the Association of Junior Leagues of America and the
Community Chests and Councils of America, Inc., sponsored a joint
study of post-war speculations for local centralized bureaus.

The

central concern behind this study was the awareness of the fact that
maintenance of citizen contributions during peacetime (a time when
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there was no moti vation for meeting wartime crisis with patriotic
service) presented a serious problem.

'This move, in turn, called for

national leadership which the Advisory Committee on Volunteer Service, established by the Community Chest and Councils of America,
assumed responsibility_

'This became in 1945 the Advisory Committee

on Citizen Participation, and which later (in 1951) became an important coordinating agency.

It coordinated federations of voluntary

organizations on a national level

(Seider, 1966).

It should be noted, at this point, that the vertically and
horizontally-oriented organizations refer to patterns which rarely
exist in pure form, and that not all of these organizations conform
perfectly to the classification as stated earlier.

More specifically,

none of the federations in the voluntary sector conform perfectly to
the definition generally found in the literature, i. e., an affiliation of
previously existing organizations.

For example, the National 'Tuber-

culosis Association was founded in 1904 by a group of doctors and
laymen and "much of the early Association staff was directed toward
the organization of state tuberculosis associations'·

(Sills, 1957:p. 8).

United Cerebral Palsy, another horizontally-oriented organization
was founded in 1949 as an affiliation of local organizations, but most
of the present affiliates were established through the encouragement of
the national office.

Despite the fact that the initiative for the estab-

lishment of the local chapters of these organizations came from the
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central national office, the proce s s of growth and adaptation has led
to a situation in which the balance of power lies in the local organizations.

Their legitimation, therefore, comes from a local source.

For this reason they are best classified as horizontally-oriented
organizations.
The Foundation for Infantile Paralysis, formed in 1937 through
the influence of President Roosevelt, illustrates a vertically-oriented
type of organization.

In creating the foundation, President Roosevelt

delegated the responsibility for combating polio to others.

From

there, the Board of Trustees delegated the operating responsibilities
to both a professional staff and to volunteers

(Sills, 1957). It is

important to note that this process of delegating authority involves
the recognition and legitimation of individual initiatives such as the
initiative of President Roosevelt as opposed to local or regional
initiative.
gators.

This, in turn, tends to alter the intentions of the dele-

As David Sills has pointed out,
This process of delegation is inherently
paradoxical in nature •.•• If you want something done right do it yourself, is the advice
dictated by folk wisdom, but complexity and
size of many organizational tasks makes this
advice gratuitous. (Sills, 1957: p. 9)

With this in mind, organizations can be seen as being in a constant
state of transformation - partly in response to certain environmental
influences, and yet partly in response to the consequences which
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emerge from the process of delegation.

Thus, it can be said that

organizations formed by an individual or a small group (such as the
Foundation for Infantile Paralysis) who appoint staff to help them
carry out the task of the organization, and when its staff, in turn,
creates conunittees, divisions, and branches, delegation is directed
downward.

As either the vertically-oriented organization (as des-

cribed above) and the horizontally-oriented organization become more
complex, and as both formal and informal rules are established, the
patterns of delegation become more complicated.
develop in which delegation goes both directions

Situations may
(Sills, 1957).

However, the funamental basis for this distinction between these
two type s of organizations is the focus of ultimate authority within the
organization.

In organizations having corporate -type of structure s,

the national headquarters exercises supervisory powers over the component units, while the federations in the affiliate retain a large
measure of autonomy.

This issue will be dealt with and elaborated on

in the discussion of dependency.

Conclusions..

Although there is much more to be said with re-

gard to the history and origin of voluntary organizations, this brief
summary has touched upon considerations involved in the development
of both the ve rtically- oriented organization and the horizontallyoriented organization which have also illustrated to a certain extent
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the distinction between these two types of organizations.

Moreover,

this summary has illustrated some important variables which distinguish busines s enterprise s and voluntary organizations.
As was mentioned previously, philanthropists, and reformers
produced the first voluntary organizations which were dedicated to
serving indi viduals.

The original mission of most of these early

organizations was to teach small voluntary societies how to give relief
so as to avoid 'Ipauperizing" people, while at the same time providing
them proper, spiritual, friendly help.

The basic ideology behind

these organizations stressed the idea of Hlocalism" and influenced in
part the development of the horizontally-oriented organization.

As

these organizations began to expand, they added devices so as to avoid
duplication, such as the development of coordinating and planning
bodies to evaluate services on a local level.

As part of the promotion

of localism these coordinating bodies also influenced the public in
terms of contributions to these local services.

This latter point

illustrates the fact that organizational decision-makers will try to
influence the context so as to maintain a preferred structure.

Through

this influence on the public, they were able to maintain the horizontallyoriented structure, such as federations.
Business organizations, on the other hand, consolidated most
of their federations into one organization or corporation so as to
avoid competition among these enterprises.

Since competition, as
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opposed to cooperation, is built right into the rubric of business organizations, consolidation was a more likely route to take.
It is also interesting to note the fact that both business organizations and voluntary organizations are similar in how they went about
developing ways in which they protected themselves against the organizational forces which have created them.

Some of the devices were

planned, some were adopted because they are generally accepted
principles of adnrinistration, and still others were established more
or less accidentally as a response to some operational problem which
was not perceived by the decision-makers as being related to the
broader problem of delegation.

These control mechanisms do in fact

serve to prevent goals of the organization from being unduly modified
despite the fact that the organizational decision-maker mayor may
not be aware of the usefulness of these features.
As horizontally-oriented organizations developed from both
internal forces (the delegation of authority) and external forces (the
push toward localism), vertically-oriented organizations also
developed from internal processes of delegation as well as external
forces calling for a unified effort to solve or concede to a particular
problem or "demand." This later point will becom.e even more
evident in the discussion on the development of government reliefgiving organizations.

Gove rnment Relief -Gi ving~anizations
As Francis Piven and Richard Cloward (1971) have pOinted out,
liThe modernization of any society generally entails expansion of the
power and authority of the national government." They have demonstrated through their historical analysis of relief-giving organizations
in capitalist societies that during disruption in the economy it is
usually local government that moderates the tremors by extending
relief.

The major decision-makers on a local level have the final say

over relief arrangements.

They are responsible for the necessary

incremental adjustments.
As mentioned previously, organizations do not adapt easily,
not only because of internal rigidities, but also because change requires that the fiscal support provided to institutions must be changed.
For example, if local relief rolls rise, the local taxpayer becomes
embittered by the rise of state taxes.

Accordingly, the ability for

local government to respond is inhibited while the expansion of the
local relief systems strains and overloads the fiscal, administrative,
and political underpinnings of the relief system.

When the local

system begins to break down, the government then responds.
Pi ven and Cloward also point out that,
The governn1.ent will also intervene on local
relief operations when the expansion of local
relief begins to intrude on the operations of the
labor market. (Piven and Cloward, 1971: p. 39)
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The government's usual response is to force "contraction" of relief.
The federal government in the United States intervened to assume a
massi ve expansion of relief during the great depression (and again in
the 1960s), but more to contract relief arrangements, thus illustrating
how an organization can institute modifications to the context in order
to maintain a preferred structure, such as the maintenance of localized
relief - gi ving organizations.
The following section will be concerned with a more detailed
description of the history and origin or government controlled reliefgiving organizations.

From this discussion certain common elements

will become apparent among government controlled organizations with
voluntary as well as business enterprises in terms of the influences
on the development of administration in the United States.

Where

government controlled relief-giving organizations have diverged from
these other organizations relates to the ways that they have instituted
modifications to the context so as to maintain a preferred structure.

The Early DeveloRment of Relief-Giving.
slowly in the United States.

Relief developed

Except in the South, agriculture was

conducted mainly by independent farmers on their own land; there
was no large rural proletariate as in England

(Pi ven and Cloward,

1971). Consequently, everyone looked out for their own.

When in-

dustrialization did set in, it grew rapidly more or less absorbing the
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growing population.

The open frontier land se rved, until the late

ninetee nth century, to drain off the deprived and the disc ontented.
Thus, as Piven and Cloward have stated, " ..• there were no serious
outbreaks of disorder so as to provoke relief concessions"

(Piven and

Cloward, 1971: p. 45).
The factors as stated above also helped to nurture the Ame rican
belief in economic individualism, liThe unshaken conviction held by the
poor and the affluent alike that rags could be converted to riches"
(Piven and Cloward, 1971: p. 46). On the one hand, this belief served
to influence the large multi-departmental business organization.

On

the other hand, it served to limit or dampen the expansion of government controlled relief - gi ving organizations.
The doctrine of self-help through work, which distinguished
nineteenth century capitalism, flourished in the U. S.

Poverty in the

U. S. came to be regarded as lithe obvious consequence of sloth and
sinfulness ... the promise of America was not affluence, but independence, not ease but a chance to work for oneself to be self-supporting,
and to win esteem through hard and honest labor II

(Piven and Cloward,

1971: p. 47). The very notion of a relief system seemed blasphemous.
As a consequence, what services that were in the way of relief were
fragmented and scattered.

Each township cared for its hungry in

different ways, such as the giving of food, incarceration in almshouses or indentured services

(Piven and Cloward, 1971).

42

With urbanization and industrialization, various problem.s and
diverse patterns of relief began to m.ultiply.

As was m.entioned pre-

viously, m.ost if not all of these patterns of relief had their source in
voluntary organizations.

Gradually a shift toward the institution of the

alm.shouse or workhouse occurred.
Boston in 1740.

The first alm.shouse opened in

By 1884 there were 600 in New England.

Eventually

states passed laws distinguishing alm.shouses as the prim.ary m.ethod
of caring for the poor.

However, it rem.ained for the local com.m.unity

to finance and operate them. (Piven and Cloward, 1971).
The idea that poor relief, if it was gi ven at all, was a local
rather than a state or federal responsibility despite the hardships of
im.m.igration, m.igration, and cyclical depressions.

Federal aid was

periodically sought and given in cases of disasters such as floods and
droughts, but not for the disaster of unem.ploym.ent.
Early on in the twentieth century, the states began to establish
pensions for the blind, the aged and widows.

For the m.ost part, the se

program.s were not m.andatory; im.plem.entation rem.ained a local and
usually a county prerogative (Piven and Cloward, 1971).

The Great Dep'ression.

When the Great Depression struck in

the 1930s,almshouses, indentured services, and private charities
remained the soul resource for the destitute.

President Hoover

limited himself to offering rhetorical encouragement to local charity
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efforts.

In addition several resolutions introduced in Congress to

aid victims of drought were defeated as was a measure to appropriate
$25 million for the Red Cross and unemployment relief

(Pi ven and

Cloward, 1971).
In 1931, with over 8 million people unemployed, the Emergency
Committee for Employment was replaced by the President's Organization on Economic Relief.

However, this organization mainly served

to publicize the need for charity, to reaffirm the virtues of local
responsibility, and to call for "coordination of local efforts"

(Piven

and Cloward, 1971: p. 51). In other words, they served to focus
their attention away from mass destitution and toward the administrative confusion among the various local charities.

Such agencies

as the State Welfare Boards were developed which served not to give
direct relief, but to coordinate local voluntary organizations.
Moreover, President Hoover's remedies for the difficult
employment situation included such programs as block aid, where
each block in the community cared for its own.
early years of the depression.

This was in the

Another plan during Hoover's term in

office was to share work by cutting work hours.

However, workers

were reluctant to share their meager earnings - in the 1930 payments
in wages declined by 300 million dollars from the first quarter of
1929 to the first quarter of 1932

(Smith and Zeitz, 1970: p. 81).

This economic decline was much more serious than anyone had
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assumed, yet the fears of a further business collapse led to the
creation of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, which provided
loans to banks, life insurance companies, railroads, and other
organizations.

It permitted that loans be made to voluntary organiz-

ations' states for relief and to potential purchasers of farm commodities.

In addition to these strategies to stimulate the economy,

Hoover also instituted the Horne Loan Bank to enable homeowners to
keep their property so as to promote new buildings
Zeitz, 1970).

(Smith and

None of these ITleasures had any iITlpact on the econoITlY

which was characterized by overproduction and underconsumption.
The burden of public and private agencie s became too great
as unemploYITlent spread and more and more people began to descend
on relief agencies with pleas for aid.

The Community Chest felt

compelled to carry a large share of the load.

They insisted in their

public reports, even during the worse part of the depre s sion, that
they rather than governITlent agencies were the appropriate vehicle
to handle relief probleITls

(Pi ven and Cloward, 1971). Most of the

relief load was carried by local tax revenues.

Reports from several

ITlaj or citie s s howe d that relief expenditure s by local ci tie s had increased froITl $22, 338, 114 in the first three ITlonths of 1929 to
$73,751,300 during the period of 1931

(Piven and Cloward, 1971).

Municipalities had to strain to ITleet these escalating relief costs.
Ad hoc scheITles were developed in these localities to try and deal
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with this strain , such as taxing municipal employees the equivalent of
a day's salary each month.

As a result , tax revenues fell off sharply

as municipalities tried to float bonds to pay for relief.
localities had been brought to the verge of bankrupcy.

Many
The concept

that the delegation of authority moves upward , and that relief is a
local re sponsibility became ineffecti ve as the environment became
more heterogeneous and dynamic, creating too many constraints for
a horizontally-oriented organization to adapt to.
Without work a way of life began to collapse,
... many began to define their hardships not
as an individual fate, but as a collective
disaster, not as a mark of individual failure,
but as a fault of the system.
(Pi ven and Cloward, 1971: p. 61)
A s the legitimacy of economic arrangements weakened, anger and
protest escalated.

The depression thus gave rise to the largest

movement of the unemployed in the history of this country.
On March 21, 1933 the destitute and the unemployed got relief.

President Franklin Delano Roosevelt called for a Civilian Con-

servation Corp, a public works program, and federal emergency
relief.

All of these strategies to centralize government programs

provided jobs for the millions unemployed.

The Public Works

Administration was then established in June of 1933 which served to
provide jobs for the needy and for fuel to the economy
Zeitz, 1970).

(Smith and
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As the government became more aware that local relief and
voluntary organizations could not handle the problems of relief,
Congress approved the Federal Emergency Relief Act of 1933 which
appropriated $500 million to provide relief to an estimated 18 million
people.

Under the direction of Harry Hopkins, administrators and

social workers were brought in to handle problems of managing such
a large centralized operation.

It was then decided that under the

supervision of the FERA money would be gi ven to state s with the
requirement that public agencies would administer funds given either
on a matching basis to states or as direct grants in those instances
where the governor proved that no funds were available.

The policies

thus established by the FERA were a significant break from the past
and represented a changed philosophy about the responsibility of
government for helping needy citizens

(Smith and Zeitz, 1970). This

strategy also represents the basis for the development of the "vertically oriented" organization among-relief giving age ncies at the
government level (where the authority is delegated from the federal
to local le vels. )
The passage of the Social Security Act of 1935 was the high
point of social legislation during the New Deal.

The program of

public welfare, like other programs under the Social Security Act,
had undergone a series of amendments to perfect the program,
broaden coverage, and liberalize benefits.

In addition, other social
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welfare programs which were assigned to a date prior to the Social
Security Act were included in the 1935 legislation

(Smith and Zeitz,

1970). Some were administered by the Social Security Board, others
carne under the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor, the U. S.
Public Health Service and other federal and state administrative
agencies.

New responsibilities and additional money were provided

to agencies administering programs under the Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1920.

The Children's Bureau, a part of the Department

of Labor until 1946, initiated programs for crippled children and
provided grants to states for promoting material and child health.
All of the se programs operated as federal- state c ooperati ve venture s,
only the insurance program for the aged was designed as a strictly
federal operation which was administered by district offices irrespec ti ve of state boundarie s.
Many have found it quite difficult to economically assess the
New Deal.

Such programs as the National Industrial Recovery Act

undoubtedly contributed to business recovery.

Regulatory legislation

helped to restore confidence in banks and business recovery.

Labor

reform led to more humanitarian working conditions in factorie s.
However, until World War II assure,d recovery by an expansion of
government into the private sector, investments, income, employment, and profits never returned to World War II levels.
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World War II.

The road of social change from Franklin D.

Roosevelt t s third inauguration in 1940 until the election of John F.
Kennedy in 1960 was filled with indirection.

Concern with winning

World War II, negative reactions to the New Deal, fear of internal
subversion and ineffective leadership made improvement of or innovation within social welfare institutions difficult.

The nation rejected

a program of national planning to prevent unemployment in 1946.

But

in 1949, when unemployment claims increased by nearly one million
because of a recession, a housing program aimed at creating jobs
recei ved congressional approval.
verted to work relief.

Direct relief was therefore con-

Piven and Cloward have pointed out that,

lIAs political stability was restored, relief practices in each locale
are re - shaped day by day to meet manpower needs " (Pi ven and
Cloward, 1971: p. 39). Thus, in the 50s a time of political stability,
work relief was cut back and the unemployed were thrown upon state
and local agencies once again.

The Turbulent 60 s.

The census bureau in 1970 reported that

between 1959 and 1969 the number Ii ving in poverty in metropolitan
areas increased from 44% to 51o/c; there was a 420/c drop in the number of white families below the poverty level while the decline for
black fanrilies was 27%

(Smith and Zeitz, 1970: p. 176). During the

60s the problems associated with this poverty consumed much of the
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energy of individuals concerned with social reform.
Politics during the decade were marked by an increasing
sense of importance of technology in rational decision-making.
Assassination of important political and moral leaders contributed
to a sense of alienation among the population.

Liberalism was

accused of,
•.. maintaining economic growth through
arms spending, of containing revolution through
a series of limited police activities, and of
buying off political discontents by building
super highways and cars. (Smith and Zeitz,
1 9 70: p. 1 96 )
All of these factors contributed to political instability and turbulence
which in turn had a dramatic impact on government-controlled reliefgi ving organizations.
On the federal level, the government r s focus in the mid 1960s
was on welfare rights.

When the federal government intervened in

local relief arrangements it did so not by directly liberalizing the
existing welfare system, but indirectly through a series of new
measures which had the consequence of mobilizing pressure against
local relief arrangements.

What emerged was a series of service

programs for the lIinner cityll - the best known was the War on
Poverty

(Piven and Cloward, 1976).

In 1961, ten million dollars was initially appropriated under
the Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Offenses Control Act for grants
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to youth developtnent projects for the prevention of juvenile delinquency.

(Piven and Cloward, 1971)

In 1963, the Cotntnunity Mental

Health Act authorized the expenditure of 150 tnillion dollars to promote community centers in the cores of cities.

A nutnber of further

programs evolved under the Johnson Administration.

In 1964, Title II

of the Econotnic Opportunity Act appropriated 350 tnillion dollars to
cotntnunity action progratns.

In 1966, Title I of the Detnonstration

Cities and Metropolitan Developtnent Act called for a cotnpre hensi ve
attack on the problems in urban areas such as slutns, blight, unetnploytnent, and coordination of federal, state, and local public
pri vate efforts.
Although each of these tneasures were later tnodified in response to feedback frotn Congress and various constituent groups
such as AMA, each was launched as a distinct White House effort,
and "each were thrust upon a Congress and a public that were at the
outset virtu(,l.lly indifferent to the specifics of the legislation"

(Piven

and Cloward, 1971: p. 260).
There were tnany cotntnonalties atnong all of the various progratns launched by the federal governtnent during the 1969s.
prog ram singled out the inner city as its tnain target.

Each

Each

channeled sotne portion of its funds to new organizations in the
inner city, circutnventing tnunicipal agencies which had traditionally
controlled services.

Most important, each made service agencies
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the target of reform.

As Piven and Cloward have pointed out,

The hallmark of the Great Society programs was the direct relationship between
national government and the ghettos, a
relationship in which both state and local
government were undercut. (Piven and
Cloward, 1971: p. 261)
A large portion of funds were di verted to a host of intermediaries
other than local government including private agencies, universities,
and new ghetto agencies.

In addition, the federal government imposed

specific guidelines for the use of these monies that were in fact
funneled through these municipal agencies.

Strategy to Eliminate Poverty.

At this point it is important to

note the strategies that the United States has used in varying combinations to prevent poverty.

One economist specializing in the study of

income maintenance discerns four such strategies: make the system
work, adapt the system to the needs of the poor, adapt the poor to the
system, and relieve the distress of the poor

(Advisory Commission

on Intergovernmental Relations, 1966: p. 16).
1. Make the System Work.

As was evident in the discussion of

business as well as voluntary organizations, the government
has played an important role in determining the structure and
ope ration of the private economy.

Functioning as acti ve pro-

moters of big business, they have influenced land-use patterns,
transport and communication systems, and the advance of
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science.

They have also intervened to smooth out swings in

the business cycle, for example, the move toward regulation
of business during the depression.
2. Ada'Rt the System to the Needs of the Poor.

Expanding suffrage

and developing common citizenship have been common ways of
adapting the system to the needs of the poor.

Examples of the

latter are criminal law and the laws of property and of torts
and contracts, mechanics lien, and usery laws, industrial
safety codes and anti-discrimination laws.

Regulating the

labor market by permitting and allowing collective bargaining
on such matters as child labor, minimum wages and maximum
hour s have a close bearing on the needs of the poor.

Social

insurance and progressive taxation are other adaptations of the
system to the needs of the poor.
3. Adapt the Poor to the System.

Attempts to rehabilitate the

poor have aimed at changing the attitudes, values, moti vations,
life-styles, and developing their potential productivity.

In

many instances the efforts of schools, churches, charitable
organizations, and labor unions were designed to transplant
middle class values and Protestant ethics to the poor in such
terms that morality and personal salvation were equated with
mate rial succe s s.
The use of broad community services is another
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eITlphasis in adapting the poor to the systeITl.

These services

involved schools, libraries, hospitals, clinics, public housing,
and sanitary iITlproveITlents.

SOITle public services have not

only been "offered" but cOITlpelled as in the case of school
attendance.
4. Relieve the Distress of the Poor.

Usually considered the

residual approach, sOITletiITles this is regarded as cOITlplementary or an alternative to the other three.

However, with the

distinction between public assistance and social insurance
becoITling less clear, the fourth strategy is considered by
SOITle as the "weapon of the future" in the poverty war.
Of the four ITlajor strategies in dealing with the probleITls of
pove rty, only the last two - adapting the poor to the systeITl and relieving the distress of the poor - had their eITlphasis on the poor as a
special group.

Developing the econoITlY and such ITleasures as the

extension of suffrage and collective bargaining were designed ITlore to
benefit the entire society than the iITlpoverished as a target group.
As ITlentioned before, the 60s and the 30s ITlarked a tiITle
where the eITlphasis on national governITlent involvement in the prograITls to eliITlinate poverty reached its peak.

The contract COITl-

pliance ITlachinery and the legal powers of the federal governITlent to
provide equal employment opportunities for disadvantaged ITlinority
groups was significantly strengthened in the 60s.

The Area
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RedevelopITlent Act of 1961 and the Manpower DevelopITlent and
Training Act of 1962 were aiITled at revitalizing econoITlically distressed cOITlITlunities and providing ITlore vocational training for
the under skilled.

The Vocational Education Act of 1963 eITlphasized

training for the disadvantaged, especially youth.

Finally, in 1964

the EconoITlic Opportunity Act provided funds and strategy for a coordinated and direct attack on the probleITls of poverty.
In 1964, the ITlajor issues that eITlerged in Congress concerned:
1) IITlposing the anti-poverty prograITl on existing agencies,

2) the

issue of separation of church and state involved in the grant prograITls,

3) the issue of states rights which involved the philosophy of

federalism and the question of Negro rights, and 4) the question of
whether the prograITl was really needed in the light of the healthy
econoITlic situation
Relations, 1966).

(Advisory C oITlITlission on IntergovernITlental
Consequently, aITlendITlents were ITlade to the

final act which departed froITl the general practice of federal grant-inaid prograITls by allowing cOITlITlunities the alternative of adzninistering
the comITlunity action prograITl through a private non-profit agency.

The Johnson Years: Creative FederalisITl.

During the Johnson

AdITlinistration over 240 grant prograITls were enacted and assistance
dollars were more than doubled.

With the exception of Medicare, all

of the enactITlents during this tiITle relied heavily on intergovernITlental
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ways of im.plem.enting program. objectives (Walker, 1974).

Johnsonian

emphasis on traditional aid program.s provoked an array of governm.ental, quasi-governm.ental, and even private sector recipients of
grant funds.

Accom.panying this was a near tripling of the direct and

indirect flow of assistance funds to urban areas that by-passed states
to local governm.ents.

As of early 1964 som.e 70 programs perm.itted

direct disbursem.ent to local governm.ents

(Walter, 1974).

The general thrust of the federal governm.ent can be seen as
a m.ove toward "Creative Federalism.." To a certain extent, "Creative Federalism." is a variation of cooperative federalism. which
stresses partnership, the sharing of responsibilities and revenues,
and finally, activism. at all levels.

The Creative Federalists during

the Johnson years ostensibly placed heavy em.phasis on rational goals
while relying on categorical grants as a m.eans of im.plem.entation.
They had an expansive view of the system. which included private
sector participants.

They also focused on goals rather than juris-

dictions and placed em.phasis on urban and city problem.s as m.uch as
rural and state concerns.

By the close of the Creative Federalist

years, nine out of every ten central cities in the largest m.etropolitan
areas were receiving m.ore federal aid on a per capita basis than
their suburban counterparts

(Walker, 1974).

The Move Toward Coordination.

As the proliferation of
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government sponsored programs occurred, the need for coordination
began to be felt by planners and administrators within the federal government.

The government responded by moving to create an elabor-

ate structure of coordination both in Washington and at the community
Ie vel.

They relied on a system of mutual adj ustment rather than

central direction upon what could be attained through negotiation
among equals - rather than the exercise of central authority (Sunquist
and Davis, 1969). James Thompson (1967) has pointed out that the
autonomy of a group facilitates coordination by mutual adjustment,
but that it is important to recognize that the autonomy is modified:
A fully autonomous unit would not be or remain a part of the organization.

Thompson (196 7) described this state as being "conditionally

autonomous." Under Creative Federalism, therefore, the unit or subset may have more decision-making power, yet it is still a part of a
larger organization - a point which many Creative Federalists overlooked.
At the federal level, the gove rnment de signated coordinator s,
each with responsibility for a particular field, but without power to
enforce coordination.

Recognizing that cabinet members cannot

exert power over one another, the statutes governing their authorities
proceeded in two ways: First of all, they authorized the coordinator
to assist or advise the President in the exercise of presidential coordinating power.

Secondly, they established mechanisms for lateral
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coordination and negotiations of agreeITlents.
The first of the coordinators - the director of the office of
Economic Opportunities (OEO) - was established by law in the
Executive Office of the president in order that he ITlight partake of
the presidential coordinating authority.

The President initially

announced that the director would be the pre sidential chief - of - staff for
the War on Poverty.

However, there is no evidence that the President

used hiITl in the chief-of-staff capacity.

OEO becaITle absorbed in-

stead in organizing and operating the Job Corps and setting up
COITlITlunity Action agencies.

It becaITle, in effect, one ITlore vertically-

oriented operating agency of the governITlent.

Consequently, on the

ITlatters of coordination, the directors of OEO negotiated with cabinet
ITleITlbers as their equals, not as their superior

(Sundquist and Davis,

1969).
An exaITlination of the directi ve s for the director of OEO, the
Secretary of HUD, the Secretary of HEW, the Secretary of Labor, and
the Secretary of COITlITlerce shows an unavoidable overlapping of
coordinating spheres.

One coordinator is responsible, for exaITlple,

of prograITls affecting urban areas, another for ITlanpower prograITls,
and still another is responsible for coordinating anti-poverty prograITls.

The question can be raised:

Is a prograITl for the training of

poor people in an urban ghetto a ITlanpower prograITl, an anti-poverty
prog raITl, or a prograITl affecting urban areas?

Obviously it is all
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three, yet which coordinator is in charge?

These kinds of juris-

dictional disputes, however, were left to be settled by negotiation
and voluntary acceptance of agreeITlents aITlong cabinet office rs
(Sundquist and Davis, 1969).
The proliferation of the vast expansion of federal public
assistance programs in the 1960s soon overwheln1.ed the local coordinating institutions that were in existence.

In the absence of an

organizational philosophy, no one solution was devised for the proble ITl of c oITlITlunity Ie vel c oordina tion.

By 1967, more than a doze n

types of federally initiated local coordinating structures could be
counted.

These differed not just in structures and functions, but also

in the e1em.ents of the cOITlITlunitiesr social and political structures upon
which they were based.

The cry for coordination that was rising

froITl governors, mayors, and other participants in the federal systeITl
was directed less toward the need for coordinating federal prograITls
as such than the need for bringing order to the maze of coordinating
structures that the federal governITlent was independently propogating
(Sunquist and Davis, 1969).
The situation as outlined above regarding coordination as a
strategy for urban problems is a continuation of a developing process
with two previous stages.

To reiterate what has been stated earlier,

the first stage began with charity organizations and councils of social
services and still later the health and welfare councils.

Federal
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level intervention marked the second stage, the most comprehensive
of which was the Model Cities Program.
during the Nixon administration.

The third stage began

It includes the main outlines of the

first earlier two, but adds an elaboration of technology and also the
proliferation of federally sponsored structures providing local frameworks for comprehensive planning under 314b and 701 planning funds,
HUD's Annual Arrangement system, the Local Executi ve Review and
Comment

Pro~ram,

and others as well

(Warren (b), 1973).

Although these programs are all complex, they are all based
on a simple rationale:
Programs to address the social problems
of the city typically fall short of expectations
because they are fragmented, wasteful, lack an
overall plan or strategy, and in some cases are
mutually contradictory. Planning must, therefore, be rational in relating means to ends, and
in reducing contradictory goals, must be definite,
and must involve all pertinent organizations in
c ollaborati ve planning and implementing pr 0cedures. (Warren (b), 1973: p. 356)
The Model Cities Project prOvides an excellent example of all
these ingredients in the coordination process.

It offered the cities

federal monies, called supplemental funds, if they could develop concentrated coordinated programs addressed to a broad spectrum of
slum area problems with some form of participation by residents as
being an essential ingredient.
As the programs began to develop two very important things
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happened.

One was the election of a new administration (the Nixon

Administration) which did not influence the development of the Model
Cities Program and did not want it to continue.

The other related to

the fact that the re suIts of the program showed little impact on the
conditions of slum living.

For the se two reasons the emphasis of the

program was changed - the program was justified not for having
bettered slum conditions, but for strengthening the cities ability for
comprehensi ve planning and coordination.
Roland Warren sums up this strategy by the following statement:
Rather than look for alternati ve strategie s,
the conclusion is to invest more in the coordinative
process. At present as indicated, the increased
investment takes the form of elaborations of
planning technology - the "hardware approach" and a proliferation of federal rubric for local coordination. This occurs de spite the formidable
weaknesses of the coordination strategy which
has been pointed out from many sources in recent
years. (Warren (b), 1973: p. 357)

The New Federalism.

The Nixon-Ford Administrations

marked a push toward the ItNew Federalism" which, as mentioned
above, stressed local authority, the coordination of services, citizen
participation, and greater discretion of state and local governments.
The difference, however, between the Nixon-Ford strategy and that
of the Kennedy-J ohnson administrations was the strong support of
decentralization of federal programs, the enactment of special
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revenue-sharing prograITls, a curbing of categorical grants-in-aid,
a strengthening of general governITlents and politically accountable
state and local officials, a strengthening of the service deli very systeITl, and generally SOITle sorting out of responsibilities for certain
functions by governITlental levels.

Put another way, the New Feder-

alisITl is basically a public shift in ITlanageITlent froITl one style to
another designed to bring public ITlanageITlent closer to the participatory systeITl.

As defined by Rensis Likert, the participati ve systeITl

provide s for full and free discussion between ITlanageITlent and involveITlent; c oITlITlunication is up, down, and sideways; decisions are ITlade
throughout the systeITl; there is little or no re sistance to ITlanageITle nt;
and control is widely shared

(Wetle and Rice, 1974).

One of the ITlajor criticisITls of the strategy proposed by the
New FederalisITl is that it has not always adhered to its publicized
principles.

Decentralization of prograITl authority to the field is only

now beginning to effect big ITloney grants.

The effecti ve organization

of the Federal Regional Councils for ITlajor liaison efforts with the
states and localities still face ITlany hurdles.

AITlong these hurdles

is included the continuing weakness of their ChairITlan's positions and
the variations in delegated discretion aITlong the various field-units.
In other words, the lines of cOITlITlunication throughout the system
have not been clearly drawn which is a necessary aspect for the
effective functioning of a decentralized systeITl.

The adITlinistration
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of the Partnership for Health and Safe Streets programs, the first two
block grants programs, has been so ineffective that the latter now has
a major categorical string attached to it, and the former is attached
to several strings plus a major HEW effort to revamp it totally.
Moreover, while general governments are supposed to be favored
under New Federalism, federally encouraged single-purpose sub-state
regional bodies have grown during the past six years to more than
1,800

(Walker, 1974).
Finally, the New Federalists realized that in order to de-

centralize, they first had to centralize.

This led to an erosion of

departmental and cabinet discretion and decision-making abilities
while it strengthened the centralizing powers of the White House staff.
(Walker, 1974)

In short, practice has not always matched New

Federalism precepts.

Summary.

From this historical description of government

controlled relief-giving organizations, a few general problem statements can be made which are relevant to what has been previously
stated and to the perspective of this study:
1. A long series of wars and economic disasters such as the
depression of the 30s threatening our public system has led to
the centralization of management at the federal level.
fortunately, this has resulted in a deterioration of the

Un-
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management capability of the continuing decentralized systems,
namely states and cities.
2. Our management system below the state level expanded
rapidly with population increases to include 36, 000 units of
local government, the results of which can be viewed as too
great a public decentralization for the effective delivery of
most public services.
3. Vertical ties have strengthened over the last four decades,
but the corporate system has not gone through adequate
corre sponding change to meet these public problems.
4. Our administrati ve and legislati ve branc he s ha ve initiated a
series of federal business management program changes
during the last twenty years, the Area Agency on Aging (AAA)
being one suc h program.

Their stated purpose has been to

decentralize the federal government or to "return power to
the pe ople.

11

5. The New Federalism design, initiated by President Nixon
seerrlS to lack a clear understanding and support from Congress and the balance of the vertical structure (states, cities,
stock holder s, and service recei ve r s).
6. During the rrlanagernent centralization period of our recent
history, state and city governments failed to develop their
internal organizations to respond to changing service needs
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and problems.

As each state and city became less able to

provide an acceptable level of public service, the federal
centralization process was reinforced.

This has led to a high

level of system frustration by public consumers, city mayors,
state governors, and legislative bodies.

From the citizen per-

spective, the most severe impact was felt by the low-income
minority and disadvantaged groups such as the elderly, all of
whom are least able to gain the attention of a centralized
system.
pation.

The intuitive turn has been toward citizen particiHowever, this change came about without a corres-

ponding change in worker acceptance, understanding, participation, and support for the need for such changes.

Conclusions.

This section describing the origin of the ex-

pansion and developm.ent of business, voluntary, and governmentcontrolled relief-gi ving organizations has served to illustrate som.e of
the environm.ental factors affecting these organizations as well as the
strategies which these organizations chose so as to deal with their
environm.ent.

Although this study deals specifically with government-

controlled organizations (Area Agencies on Aging), the description
of business as well as voluntary organizations help to draw a clearer
picture of the factors influencing the "vertically-oriented" organization.

The following two sections will deal with organizational context
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in terms of dependency and interorganizational relations, both have a
direct bearing on the description of the vertically-oriented organization.

Dependency
Based on a conception advanced by Richard Emerson, an
organization is dependent on some aspect of its task environment,
1) in proportion to the organization I s need for resources which that
element can provide, and 2) in inverse proportion to the ability of
these elements to provide the same resources.

(Emerson, 1962)

For instance, a branch of a welfare department which is totally dependent upon its parent organization for its resources, is dependent
upon the state department of welfare to the extent that the branch
needs financial resources and those resources are not available from
other sources.
Dependence can also be seen as the obverse of power.

Peter

Blau (1964) has argued that actors or organizations involved in social
exc hange who are unable to reciprocate fully end up using compliance
to the senior's wishes.

According to this assumption "power is a

generalized currency used to equilibrate exchange imbalances"
(Jacobs, 1974: p. 48).

For example, the branch of the welfare de-

partment, who may need resources from the parent organization but
who is unable to give anything in return, ends up giving compliance .to
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the parent organization's wishe s.
Blau, in turn, made an important contribution to Emerson's
work.

He pointed out the existence of coersion as a means to influ-

ence.

Power and control then can be thought of in terms of vulner-

ability as well as dependence.

The following Table sums up strategies

of both the dependent and dominant parties in an unbalanced exchange
relationship.

TABLE I
A SUMMARY OF EXCHANGE AND POWER

Alternatives for Compliance for the Dependent

Conditions of
Independence

Strategie s of the
Dominant

1. Supply powerholder

Availability of
strategic resources

Remain indiffe rent
to what dependent
offers

2. Obtain scarce rewards elsewhere

Alternative sources
of supply for scarce
rewards

Maintain naonopoly
ove r what dependent
needs

3. Take scarce goods
by force

Coercive force

Maintain law and
order

4. Do without

Ideals defining
scarce rewards as
unnecessary

Sustain value s whic h
define particular
scarce rewards as
necessities

other inducements

Blau, 1964: p. 124
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This approach to dependence and power has several advantages
to the study of organizations.

It leads to the consideration of relation-

ships between the organization and the several elements of its pluralistic task environment.

Thus, an organization may be relatively

powerful in relation to those who supply its inputs and relati vely
powerless in relation to those who receive its outputs or visa-versa.
On the other hand, an organization may be powerful in terms of both
its outputs and inputs.
Those organizations who are relati vely powe rle ss on all
sectors of its task environment usually end up catering to whatever
fleeting intere sts of an unstable population it could acti vate at a
particular time

(Thompson, 1967).

Finally, the power-dependence concept as indicated by this
approach provides an important deviation from Emerson's concept
of power which assumes that the power of one organization is at the
expense of another.

By taking into consideration the concept of

interdependence, we admit to the pos sibility that two organizations
may become increasingly powerful with regard to each other.

It is

this possibility upon which coalitions rest.
Viewing dependence in this context, also calls into question
the closed system models of organizations since, as mentioned
previously, the open-system.s m.odel explicitly includes organizationenvironment relations in the assessment of the effectiveness of a
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gi ven structure.

Since the conditions promoting organizational de-

pendence and independence vary over time and organizational contexts,
it is likely that under different organizational conditions different
forms of structure will facilitate the bargaining position of the organization.

By critiquing the work of the A ston Group study conducted by

Pugh, Hickson, and their associates (1969) this point will become
more apparent.
In this study, 52 organizations in Birmingham, England were
studied.

Fourty- six of the 52 organizations were randomly sampled

and were used in the analytic phase of their study.

Dependence, one

of the weaker points in this study, was conceptualized as either
relationships with the parent organization and/or relations with other
organizations.

The former was considered the most important.

It

was operationalized by 1) the relati ve size of the focal organization in
relation to the parent organization;

2) the status of the focal organiz-

ation in its group, that is whether it was an independent organization,
a subsidy with legal identity, a head branch, or a branch;

3) the

repre sentation of the focal organization in the policy-making bodie s
of the parent organization; and 4) the number of specializations contracted outside the focal organization, both from the parent organization and from other organizations.
Dependence on other organizations was operationalized using
five scales: 1) Integration with suppliers in terms of ownership and
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contractual ties, 2) response to the focal organization to customer
influence,

3) integration with customers in terms of ownership and

contractual ties, 4) percentage of the focal organizations output
volume consumed by its largest customer, and 5) percentage of the
largest customer's needs supplied by the focal organization.
The operationalization of dependence also included: 1) The
origin of the organization - was it founded by indi viduals or by another
organization?

And 2) the public accountability of the parent organiz-

ation - whether it was quoted in the stock exchange or whether it was
a government department, the latter being more publicly accountable.
Briefly summing up the results, the study found that those
organizations who scored highest on dependence were publicly
accountable, such as government departments founded by another
organization with a large number of specializations contracted out,
vertically integrated, small in size relati ve to the parent organization,
low in status, and not represented at the policy level.

They also

found that dependent organizations have a more centralized authority
structure and tend to standardize procedures for advancement and
selection.

They conclude, in turn, that,
. .. dependence of an organization reflects
its relations with other organizations in its
social environment, such as suppliers, customers, competitors, labor unions, management organizations, and political and social
organizations. (Pugh, et al, 1969: p. 104)
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While it may be that more dependent organizations demonstrate
these characteristics, Pugh and his associates did not carry through
their distinction between dependency on parent organizations'dependencies on other organizations.

This is a very important distinction

due in part to the different resources sought from these two sources.
From the parent organization, the focal organization needs financial
resources and usually seeks autonomy in decision-making so that its
administrators can make decisions on their own.

From other organ-

izations, especially suppliers, customers and competitors, the
organization needs raw materials, a market for its products or
service s, and a large enough share of the market to survi ve

(Mindlin

and Aldrich, 1975). This distinction needs to be made in any analysis
of dependence.

However, in computing dependence scores for each

organization as well as analyzing the relation of dependence to other
structural barriers, the Aston group made no further reference to
the two forms of dependence and ceased to make the distinction in
their writing.

DeRendence and Inward Orientation.

Following along the

assumption that organizational decision-makers are typically oriented
to an adequate supply of resources, and that this orientation becomes,
for organizational decision-makers, an operational definition of the
purpose s of the organization and thus of their re sponsibilitie s as
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decision-makers, then we can assume that because vertically-oriented
organizations are dependent upon the parent organization for virtually
all of its resources, they will be independent of other organizations in
their functional and geographic community.

In other words, because

of this dependency on a single organization outside of the community,
the vertically-oriented organization expends a great deal of its energy
complying to the parent body.

Consequently, most of its concerns

will be focused inwardly rather than on interorganizational activities.
Burton Gummer, in his study of a welfare agency (an organization whic h was dependent upon a parent organization for the vast
supply of its resources) analyzed the responses of the personnel in
the department to a questionnaire which asked what they thought their
unique competence was in their jobs.

Content analysis produced the

following four categories:
1. The services provided by the respondent's unit, such as family
counseling, housing, horne management, etc.;
2.

the worker's skill in helping people;

3. knowledge of public welfare procedures; and
4. knowledge of community resources.
Nearly one - half of the 27 line workers listed either service of the unit,
worker I s skill or knowledge of agency procedure s as their unique
competence, while only three listed knowledge of comm.unity resources.

The remaining nine listed a wide range of activities as their
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unique competence.

This suggests that the model orientation of the

line workers is toward activities performed in the organization
(Gummer, 1975).
Even m.ore significant was his findings with regard to the
agency's hierarchy.

At the supervisory level only two of the fi ve

unit supervisors specifically mentioned knowledge of community
resources as a unique competence, and only one of the five developed
guidelines for interorganizational activities in the unit.

At the level

of the executive and deputy executive positions, the orientation was
entirely toward agency operations.

This evidence combined with the

findings of Levine and White's study (1961) and that of Levine, White,
and Paul (1969) point to the conclusion that vertically-oriented organizations are more dependent upon a resource base outside the community, and less dependent upon those organizations in a functional
and geographic community.
As mentioned above, all organizations must have external
support to exist, and to get this support organizations must be
perceived as functional by those whose support they depend on, i. e. ,
they must be accountable to those organizations who are the pro viders of resources.
of the organization.
ness.

Survival, however, is not the only concern
Another concern is the organization's effective-

In this model, activities are evaluated in term.s of whether

they further a particular goal.

What is common about the survival
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model and the effecti vene s s model is that acti vitie s and goals are
the primary means by which organizations establish themselves in
the environment.
definition.

They are critical to both their existence and role

To the extent to which the organization must demonstrate

that their acti vitie s are functional for the ends of those who are
supporting them, the two models converge.

Given this perspective,

part of the inward orientation characterized by the vertically-oriented
organization is subsumed with the legitimization of its stated goals.
According to John Tropman, organizations that expend much effort
on the legitimation of goals, Her se, exhibit a lack of a concrete
planning or action output - they may become dominated by maintenance needs.

This is particularly apparent among vertically-oriented

organizations and causes to a certain extent serious problems in
terms of service delivery

(Rothman, 1974: p. 140).

Control of DeRendence.

As noted earlier, the task environ-

ment is defined by the dependence of the organization.

Since depend-

ence introduces constraints and contingencies, the problem for the
organization is to avoid becoming subservient to elements of the task
environment.

James Thompson has propositioned that: "When support

capacity is concentrated in one or a few elements of the task environment, organizations under norms of rationality seek power relative to
those whom they depend on "

(Thompson, 1967: p. 34). What is
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expected from this proposition. therefore. is that organizations subject to rationality norms and constrained by monopolized capacity
for suppor t , su ch as

On the case of the vertically-oriented organiz-

I

ation, will strategize toward achieving power to offset their dependence.

The question then is how to achieve power when the environ-

ment does not offer many alternative sources support.
When organizations establish domains, they acquire dependence.

However, as stated above, the acquisition of dependence is

not so easy.

In the managelTIent of the attem.pt to gain power with

respect to SOlTIe elelTIent in the task environlTIent, organizations
em.ploy cooperative strategies (Thom.pson and McEwen, 1958).

To

accomplish this, the organization must be able to demonsrate its
capacity to reduce uncertainty for that elelTIent, and lTIust make a
commitlTIent to exchange that capacity.
Thus, an agreem.ent between A and B, specifying that A will
supply and B will purchase reduces uncertainty for both.

A has

more knowledge about its output targets and B about its inputs.
Likewise, the affiliation of a pri vate non-profit drug program. with
a county mental health clinic reduces uncertainty for both.

The drug

program will have increased assurance that it has the resources to
operate, and the mental health clinic will have the assurance that it
is satisfying a m.andate to provide services to drug-dependent
individuals.

Consequently, the mental health clinic is able to
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-t

establish power with respect to

1

s

source 01 dependency, that being

the state ITlental health division.
By using cooperative strategies the effective achieveITlent rests
on the exchange of cOITlITlitITlents for the reduction of uncertainties for
both partie s.

But cOITlITlitITlents are obtained by gi ving cOITlITlitITlents.

These commitITlents are a two-way street, and ITlanageITlent of interdependencies confront the organization with dileITlITlas.

The use of

contracting, coopting, and coalescing presents a set of alternatives
to the organization, and represent different degrees of cooperation
and comITlitment.
Contracting refers here to the negotiation of an agreeITlent
for the exchange of perforITlances in the future.

This usage is not

restricted to those agreeITlents which legal bodies would recognize.
It includes the kind of agreements between the drug prograITl and the
county ITlental health clinic as illustrated above.

It also covers the

understanding between a university and a donor involving, for example,
the naITling of buildings.

Contractual agreeITlents thus ITlay rest on

the faith and the belief that the other will perform in order to maintain a reputation or prestige.

In the case of the vertically-oriented

organization this is one way in which they can reduce their depende ncy on the parent organization.
Recently, the federal government has gotten wise, so to
speak, to this strategy and has placed a mandate on certain
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coordinating bodies to forITl these
organizations ·

contractual agreeITlents with other

This is designed, in effect, to reduce the organiz-

ation's dependence upon the parent organization and thus facilitate
the deli very of services.

However, fitting into the proposition that

organizations that expend ITluch effort on legitiITlation of goals,

p'er~,

such as gaining public approval for existence exhibit a lack of concrete planning or action output, then one would expect that this ITlandate would be ineffective in accomplishing its stated purpose.

In

other words, with this ITlandate, one would expect the organization to
expend too much energy legitimizing itself through contractual
arrangements rather than acting.

Consequently, a contradiction is

placed on the organization with this stipulation as a condition for the
receipt of funds.
Burton Gummer (1975) illustrated the low level of activity in
this area for the branc h public welfare agency de spite the importance
attached to contractual arrangements for the delivery of service in
the official guidelines.
Coopting has been defined as, liThe process of absorbing new
elements into the leadership or policy-determining structure of an
organization as a means of averting threats to its stability or existence

II

(Thompson, 1967: p. 35).

Cooptation increases the certainty

of future support by the organization coopted.

The acceptance of the

corporation's board of directors of representatives of financial
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institutions, for example, increases the likelihood of acce ss to
The

financial resources for the duration of the cooptive arrangement.
drawback to this alternative to reducing dependency is that it places
an element of the environment in a position to raise questions and perhaps exert influence on other aspects of the organization.

For vertic-

ally-oriented organizations, this is a risky move to take in terms of
its own survival.
Coalescing refers to a combination or a joint activity with
another organization or organizations in the environment.

To the

extent that the coalition is operative, the organizations involved act
as one with respect to certain operational goals.

"Coalitions not only

provide a basis for exchange, but also require commitments for
future decision-making

II

(Thompson, 1967: p. 35). This strategy to

decrease dependency is a more constraining form than coopting, and
is therefore an unfeasible strategy for a vertically-oriented organization.

This point, in turn, will be stressed in the next section

discus sing interorganizational variables such as frequency of interaction and joint decision-making.
A final criticism of the use o f cooperative strategies centers
on the fact that many programs intended to proVlo de enhanced cooperation between agencies faol
b ecause cooperation is sought without
1
attending to underlying power relations (Benson, 1975).

A good ex-

am.ple of such a situation is the Cooperative Area Manpower Planning
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System which is designed to produce coordination among manpower
programs.

'This program failed because it relied upon voluntary

cooperation of participant organizations and provided for no change
in the underlying political-economic forces which had previously kept
the agencies apart.

Much of this has to do with the structure of the

coordinating agency

.Yi2.. a

vis its major provider of resources.

ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONS: FREQUENCY OF INTERACTION

This section will be concerned with interorganizational relations in terms of frequency of interaction. 3

An attempt will be

made to describe, in more detail, some of the theoretical basis for
much of the research in this area.

From this description several

implications can be drawn with regard to the vertically-oriented organizations and their relationship with organizations in a particular
network.

Exc hange Theory
Levine and White (1961) have stated that the interdependence
of the parts of the exchange system is contingent upon three related
factors:

1) The a ccessl·b·l"
1 Ity

0f

each organization to necessary

3 Frequency of interaction has been defined as "Th
contact, between organizations to be measured in rela;ion t: ::ount of
lzahon s total contacts with others. 11 (Aldrich, 1973: p. 64)
organ-

79
2) the obje c ti ve s of the or.
d
a
particular
system,
resources ()ut Sl e
to which it allocates the resources
ganization and particular functions
h" h domain consensus exists among
the
degree
to
w
1C
3)
it contro1 s, and
They go on to illustrate how each of the se
the various organizations.

exchange of elements among organizations.
three factors affect the
.
th various parts (or
A s illustrated in the previous sectlon,
e
organizations) of a

system can be differentiated from each other in

terms of their relative depend ence

upon other parts of the system.

"n parts are relatively depende nt, not having
To reite rate, ce rta1
em which is characterized by the
access to elements outside th e syst
horizontally-oriented organization, whereas others, which have
access to elernents outside the system, possess a high degree of
independence or IIfunctional autonomy.

lJ

(Gouldner, 1960).

In their study of health organizations, Levine and White (1961)
found that those organizations who are relatively autonomous from
the rest of the organizations in a particular system, and thus possess
a high degree of independence, tend to interact less with other local
agencies than those who are dependent upon the system for their
needed resources.

An examination of the four vertically-oriented

organizations, in their study, reveals that three of them give resources to other programs to carry out their acti vities and the fourth
conducts broad educational programs.

They point out that such

functions tend to involve less relationships with other organizations
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than those that provide direct services.
They also point out, that the vertically-oriented organization
may at times produce specific disagreenlents with other agencies
in the system.

This is dem.onstrated by the criticisms fronl the local

health system toward a community branc h of an· official state re habilitation program.

The rehabilitation progranl in order to justify its

existence to the legislature had to show that a certain nUnlber of
persons had been successfully rehabilitated.

In other words, the

services by this program had to successfully return to self-supporting
roles a certain number of its debilitated clients.

In order to accom-

plish this the rehabilitation program has to accept a select group of
people causing a great deal of frustration among the local system.
The frustration relates to the fact that other agencies are unable to
get the state to accept their debilitated clients for rehabilitation.
the eyes of these other agencies
remiss in fulfilling its goals.

B

,

In

the state rehab·l·t t.
.
1 1 a Ion agency IS

ecause the state agency has to sur-

vive' it is more concerned with its relationsh1·p to the

legislators who

control the "pur se string s" than to the re st

of the system. Given the
definition of the organ· t·
I
1za Ion s goals, and the state agency's relati ve
independence of the local health

system., its interaction with other

organizations is relatively low.
Levine, White, and Paul (1963),
health care age

in their study of 68 vOluntary
.
.
nCles In four connnunities
.
pOInt out Som.e of the
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problems facing the delivery of health services due to the multiple
sources of authority.

On the one hand, there are agencies like the

National Foundation, American Heart Association, and the American
Cancer Society where the authority is delegated downward from the
national or state organization to the local chapter.

These organiz-

ations are referred to in this perspective as having vertical orientations or corporate structures.

On the other hand, there are or-

ganizations with horizontally-oriented structure s such as the Visiting
Nurses Association and the Family Services which delegate authority
to the state and national levels.

These horizontally-oriented organ-

izations in this perspecti ve are more geared toward the needs of the
local community.
Given such diverse sources of authority, then it is understandable why maximal inter-agency cooperation is not always attained.
As a result, of these divergent sources of authority, and for many
other reas ons as well, organizations in the health and welfare system
have varying goals which often times conflict.

Agencie s differ in the

standards they employ to evaluate success and the means they use to
achieve their objectives.
They point out, in turn, that the importance of conflicting
goals, especially those from outside the system, are particularly
evident when it comes to fund raising.

For example, vertically-

oriented organizations such as the American Cancer Society resist
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pleas of horizontally-oriented fund raising advocates and carry out
their own fund raising campaign.

Moreover, these vertically-oriented

organizations are frequently under attack by agency personnel and
board members for not spending a greater amount of their collected
funds for local services.

They illustrate the fact that much of this

clamor and controversy relates to the varying goals and objectives of
the se agencie s.

Ve rtically- oriented organizations requiring greater

centralization of resources on the federal level are understandably
alert to activities on the local level which may impede the flow of
sufficient funds to the national body.

In othe r words, the se organi z-

ations in their fund raising dri ve view the health picture from a
national vantage point.

While the local chapters are oriented partly

to their respective community, the authority of these local affiliates
is limited by the priorities established by national headquarters.

By

contrast, organizations such as the Community Chest and the United
Funds (both horizontally-oriented organizations) are geared more toward the local community

Rer~.

Given the fact that these two

organizations have different goals and objectives, it is understandable
why they have difficulty interacting with one another.

Organizational InterdeEendencies
Both of these studies point out a very real problem facing the.
vertically-oriented organizations in term.s of a low level of inter-
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action with other organizations in a given com.m.unity, yet their
definition of interdependency is extremely narrow.

As Aiken and

Hage (1968) have pointed out, studies of organizational interdependencies such as these essentially conceive of the organization as an
entity that needs inputs and provides outputs, linking together a
number of organizations by mechanisms of exchange or transactions.
Linkages between organizations, however, are conceived of in a
variety of ways; passage of information, transfers of clients or funds
or the input-output exchange as mentioned above, and sharing of
facilities.

Looking at these forms of linkages as a continuum of

interdependence, then passage of information would have relati vely
low interdependence, while the sharing of facilities or joint activities
would have relatively high interdependence.

What is implied is that

joint programming, as a definition for interdependence, makes an
implicit tec hnological as sumption that the production proce s s requires joint efforts that transcend organizational boundaries thus
,involving a lessening of organizational autonomy.

Because organiz-

ations like to maintain their autonomy, there is a natural tendency for
organizations to avoid creating interdependencies except in relatively
safe areas that are auxilliary to the main objecti ve s.

Jerald Hage

(1975) gives the example of Welfare organizations who will join into
joint activities which have relatively little to do with their objectives,
for instance, such activities as education and research.
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At this point it is important to distinguish the joint program
from the jOint organization.

The latter refers to a situation in which

two or more organizations create a separate organization for some
common purpose.

For example, the Community Chest was created

by the health welfare agencies for fund raising purposes.

Business

organizations have created joint organizations so as to provide service
functions.

These example s clearly illustrate the difference between

a joint program and a joint organization, the latter having separate
corporate identities and quite often their own staff, budgets, and
objectives.

Some examples of joint programs would be the student

exchange program among Harvard, Yale, Columbia, and Cornell
Universities.

Among business organizations, Ford and Mobile have

begun a joint research project designed to develop superior gasoline.
Burton Gummer (1975), in his study of the interorganizational
relationships of a public welfare agency, operationalized his dependent
variable (contacts with other organizations) by foc using on the exte nt
to which these contacts are indicative of a sharing of resources between organizations with a consequent heightening or organizational
interdependence.

The underlying continuum used in this context is

the degree to which the sharing of resources involves a lessening of
organizational autonomy, particularly in the area of internal decisionmaking processes.

Consequently, at one end of the continuum he

focused on exchanges that involve little or no infringements on
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organizational autonomy suc h as the sharing of information about
one r S own service or the gaining of information regarding another
organization's acti vities.

At the other end of the continuum are ex-

changes that involve a major inroad into the internal decision-making
process such as joint programs.

This variable, therefore, was

termed "purpose of contact" and was measured at an ordinal level:
Information (low interdependence), Service (moderate interdependence), and Joint Activity (high interdependence).
By information, the respondents were asked whether their
contacts with other organizations involved telephone contacts, informal meetings, and/or letters for the sale purpose of obtaining
information.

By service, respondents were asked about referrals

to other agencies, follow-up, contacts after referrals, acting as an
intermediary to facilitate obtaining service s for a client, and in.formal meetings about a client as a primary source of contacts with
other agencies.

Finally, respondents were asked whether these con-

tacts involved formal case management in which joint decisionmaking occurred, the development of joint services such as a
common intake, and contractual arrangements to purchase services
from other organizations.

4

4Note: Aiken and Hage argue that the purchase of services does
not fit into the category of joint activity because it does not affect the
internal decision-making structure of an organization. However,
Gummer points out that the experience of the social welfare field,
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The overall conclusion that Gummer reached after analyzing
his data is that, while the public welfare agency personnel engaged in
extensive contacts with other agencies, the intensity of these contacts
in terms of the number of contacts with anyone agency was not that
great.

Over three -fourths of the contacts fell into the low contact

rate category, meaning that the vast majority of the agencies contacted were made by a few workers and on an infrequent basis.
Furthermore, the data reveals that the overwhelming bulk of contacts
were for the purpose of obtaining service for clients.

This study, in

turn, illustrated the fact that the ve rtically- oriented organization will
be less likely to be involved in interaction which involve a high degree
of interdependence (joint activities).
John Clark and Richard Hall (1974), in their research involving organizations concerned with problem youth, also shed some
light on the area of interorganizational relations, especially in the
area of frequency of interactions" which provide some strong implications to Gummer's work.

The design of their study involved

asking these organizations about the nature of interorganizational
relations.

These detailed questions were an attempt to quantify the

particularly the relationship of the federal government to state and
local governments via the grant-in-aid programs, suggests otherwise.
The purchaser of service is in a position to exert some influence on
the internal decision-making structure of the provider organization
by imposing requirements on how the service should be provided, who
should receive them .. and under what conditions.
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quality of the relationships with each organization.

Each respondent

was asked to indicate the frequency and importance of their organization's contacts in this particular network.
The results of the study showed that: 1) Conflict between
organizations is positi vely related to good communication as is frequency of interactions; 2) coordination efforts are rather strongly
associated with such factors as availability of personnel, the importance of contacts, compatible operating philosophies, the assessment
of good performance on the part of the other agencies, and the assessment that the other organizations have competent personnel; and
3) coordination is also positively related with good communication,
suggesting that communications can playa dual role in leading to
coordination and being part of conflict situations .

Generally, this

study pointed out that frequency of interaction, in terms of the
intensity of contacts made to other organizations in a network, is
positi vely related to coordination, communication, and conflict.

In

this case, frequency of interaction does seem to lead to better and
more coordinated efforts, at the same time it leads to conflict.

Gi ven

the results which Gummer found in his study, then one could conclude
that the vertically-oriented organization such as the welfare branch,
would be less likely to be involved in coordinated efforts with other
organizations in a network, that is, efforts such as joint programs.
Aiken and Hage (1968) in their study of sixteen human service
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organizations, exaITline the issues involved in the following proposition:

"Organizations having ITlany joint prograITls with other or-

ganizations te nd to be ITlore c oITlplex, ITlore innovati ve, have ITlore
internal cOITlITlunication channels, and have slightly ITlore decentralized
decision-ITlaking channels." (RothITlan, 1974: p. 116)

Their iITlplicit

assuITlption is that cOITlplexity (naITlely a high degree of professionalization and diversity of occupations) leads to intensified cOITlITlunication between different occupations, which consequently enriches the
organizational package of ideas, prograITls, etc.

Because the

vertically-oriented organization is less likely to be involved in joint
prograITls then one would expect these organizations to be less
innovative, have a ITlore centralized decision-ITlaking structure, have
less internal cOITlITlunication, and tend to be ITlore forITlalized.
Howard Aldrich (1973) in his theoretical ITlodel propositioned
that the concentration of resources in a given network of organizations'
attracts those organizations which seek to exploit the re source s by
entering into ITlore frequent interaction with the organization holding
those resources.

By looking at resources in terITlS of ITloney and

authority (legitiITlation), it is possible to see the dispersion of resources in a given network of organizations where SOITle are verticallyoriented organizations.

Following along Aldrich's proposition, it is

possible to see why the vertically-oriented organization does not enter
into frequent interactions with other organizations, i. e., they are not
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attracted to exploit the resources in a given community.

Aldrich

went on to show that a high frequency of interaction leads to the development of formalized relations (on an interorganizational level) as
organizational learning take s place and each organization gives recognition to the transaction. 5

Fortnalized relations, according to

Aldrich's theory, lead to a stabilizing effect on the environment, i. e.,
the degree of turnover in the elements of the task environment.

If

one follows along with what has been presented then this proposition
has several itnplications for the vertically-oriented organization, that
is, they will be less likely to give formal recognition to transactions
made to other organizations in a given network, thus presenting instability to the e nvironm.ent.

PROPOSITIONS CONCERNING THE VERTICALLY-ORIENTED
ORGANIZATION

Based on what has been stated throughout this theoretical
description, the following are a set of propositions which try to sum
up the characteristics of the vertically-oriented organization:

5Note : Aldrich defines formalization as: 1) The extent to
which the transaction between two organizations or groups is gi ven
official recognition, for example, if agreements are legislati vely
mandated or at the other end of the continuum, if they are ad hoc
or informal; and 2) the extent to which an interm.ediary coordinates
the relationship.
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Proposition 1.

Where there are organizations formed by an individual
or a small group (ve rtically- oriented organizations)
who appoint staff, and when staff creates committees
divisions, and branches, the delegation of authority
is directed downward.

Proposition 2.

Where authority runs downward from the federal or
state to local level (such as in the vertically-oriented
organization) the ultimate control of re source sand
the decision-making within the organization rests with
national headquarters, i. e., it is "conditionally
autonomous.

Proposition 3.

II

Because the vertically- oriented organization is dependent upon a parent body for virtually all of its
resources and is unable to reciprocate fully, it ends
up using compliance to the senior's wishes.

Proposition 4.

Because the vertically-oriented organization is constrained by a central authority, they will be less
likely to control dependency through cooperation
strategies such as cooptation and coalition formation.

Proposition 5.

Because the vertically- oriented organization expends
much effort on the legitimation of goals they lack a
concrete planning or action output - they become
dominated by maintenance needs.

Proposition 6.

Because the vertically-oriented organization becomes
dominated by internal concerns, they are less likely
to become involved in intense interactions (i. e., joint
activities) with other organizations in their functional
and geographical community.

Proposition 7.

Finally, vertically-oriented organizations, because
they are less likely to become involved in joint
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prograITls will less likely becoITle involved in coordinated efforts with other organizations.
FroITl these propositions a structural explanation for the
causes of interorganizational coordination is offered.

NaITlely, the

organization's capacity to engage in inte rorganizational ac ti vitie swill
be a function of its location

vis-~-vis

its major providers of resources.

The serious probleITl of fragITlentation aITlong the hUITlan service deli very systeITl is due in part to those organizations in a verticallyoriented structure, and their inability to interact with other organiza tions in their locality.

SUITlITla ry .

To sUITlITlarize what has been stated thus far, the

vertically-oriented organization illustrates certain distinguishing
characteristics: They exist in a larger structure where the authority
flows downward and where the ultiITlate source of authority rests on
either the federal or state level.

Finally, they are accountable to the

parent organization (they have certain stipulations and/or ITlandates
placed on theITl by the parent body as a condition for the receipt of
funds.)

FroITl these characteristics, certain behaviors can be antici-

pated in terITlS of the vertically-oriented organization's internal as
well as external concerns and activities.

The propositions as stated

above exeITlplify, to a certain degree, these characteristics (propositions 1-2) and the anticipated behavior (propositions 3 - 7).

CHAPTER IV

THE AREA AGENCY ON AGING: CASE MATERIAL

The Area Agency on Aging, a program developed out of Title III
of the Older Americans Act (1973), was chosen as an example of the
vertically-oriented organization, and thus will be used as case
material supporting the above mentioned propositions.

The unique

feature about this organization" aside from its vertical ties with the
federal government, is that it was specifically designed to promote
horizontal relations in the area from which it will operate.

It is thus

the latest federal attempt to devise a system which will insure the
delivery of coordinated services to the elderly.

Given the fact that

this organization resembles a vertically-oriented organization, then
one would expect that it would be more concerned with internal survival, and thus less likely to be involved in intense interorganizational
activities.

It is the assumption of this analysis, therefore, that this

organization would be ineffecti ve in reac hing its stated goals whic h
focus on the coordination of services for the elderly for the purpose
of promoting independent functioning in their home environment.
Based on the propositions as stated earlier, the following
section will attempt to demonstrate the Area Agency on Aging's
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resemblances to the vertically-oriented organization in terms of the
direction and source of authority, the issue of accountability (who
conrols the vast bulk of money and authority), and the anticipated
behavior of the Area Agency on Aging.

To help substantiate these

propositions concerning the anticipated behavior of the Area Agency on
Aging (AAA) a few select responses from a questionnaire given to
approximately 77 organizations throughout Oregon will be used.

This

study (the Concord Study) was conducted in 1974 by staff members
from the Institute on Aging, Portland State University, and involved
an extensi ve interview with a staff person in organizations representing the following sectors: local government, local service
agencies, senior groups, and other related organizations.

The dis-

tricts covered in the survey included such counties as Washington,
Columbia, Clackamas, Multnomah, Lane, Wasco, Sherman, Hood
River, and Clark County.

The main focus of the questionnaire

centered on their perception of the Area Agency on Aging in terms of
conflict and coordination in their particular network.

The questions

used for this description involved: 1) How they see the impact of the
AAA on the local service community, and the elderly;

2) what they

thought the AAA is supposed to do for old people, government bodies,
and local service agencies, and how that compares with what they
thought the AAA is actually doing to meet their goals and objec ti ve s;
and 3) the extent to which the AAA has collaborated with other pro-
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grams in terms of joint activities.
Gi ven this relatively limited amount of data, it is irnportant
to note that the intent of using the AAA as case rnaterial in this
context is not to ernpirically test these propositions

Rer~.

Rather

this is a theoretical atternpt to describe the vertically-oriented
organization with the hope that furture elaboration and refinernent will
be made in this relatively untouched area.

DIRECTION AND SOURCE OF AUTHORITY

ProRosition 1. Where there are organizations founded by an
indi vidual or a srnall group who appoint staff,
and when staff creates comrnittees, di visions,
and branches, the delegation of authority is
directed downward.
Robert Hudson (1974, pp. 43-44) in his description of the
developmental steps which the area agencies are required to follow
through illustrate s the ve rtical formation of the AAA.

He state s that,

In order to bring the area agencie s into
existence the state agencies are charged with
1) seeing that the state establishes planning
service areas - which rnay or rnay not correspond to other substate planning jurisdictions for purposes of aging planning, 2) deterrnining
which of these areas should be designated high
priority areas - that is, eligible for special
funding for both planning and special services,
3) deterrnine what type of agency or organization
is to be designated as an area agency either public, private, or non -profit, and 4) rnaking an
initial planning grant to such an agency for purposes of cornprehensi ve aging planning.
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The staff of the new agency, in turn, are charged with the developITlent
of comprehensive and coordinated programs.

As is obvious from this

description, the forITlation or the developITlent of the area agency
follows along a vertical pattern - from the federal government to the
state and on down to the area level.

Moreover, because this develop-

ment does take on a vertical pattern, it is possible to see where the
ultimate source of authority lies.

The federal government has the

final decision-making authority over these agencies.

This final

decision-making power relates to the issue of who controls the resources and who makes the stipulations as to where and how this
money and authority should be used.

CONTROL OF RESOURCES
(A c c ounta bility)

Prop-osition 2. Where the authority runs downward from the
federal or state to the local level, the ultilllate control of resources and the decisionmaking within the organization rests with
national headquarters, i. e., they are "conditionally autonomous. "
To reiterate, the vast bulk of resources (money and legitimation) flowing into the vertically-oriented organization are controlled
by the parent body.

This is particularly apparent in the A rea Agency

on Aging where the vast bulk of their financial support and their
legitimation is provided to them by the federal government for their
support.

Given the fact that organizational decision-makers are
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typically oriented to the adequate supply of resources and that this
orientation determines, within fairly restrictive lim.its, the nature
of interactions on the service delivery level and in the performance
of mandated functions, then this has important implications for the
functioning of the Area Agencies on Aging.
Compared with the older amendments (the 1965,1967, and
1969 amendments), Title III which established the area agencies is
more tightly integrated administratively and is designed to have
greater congruence between goals and resources (Hudson, 1974).

A

two-part national goal was established which federal, state, and
area agencies will be working toward and which specifically focuses
on 1) keeping the older American in his horne environment,

and

2) removing any additional economic barriers so that the older American can be economically independent.

The law specifies certain

target populations - the poor and minority group older persons - to
recei ve priority attention.

Special planning grants will then be

appropriated to those parts of the states designated as priority areas
for the development of comprehensive and coordinated networks of
service s (Hudson, 1974: p. 43).

The area agency thus is charged

with the function of eliminating gaps in service s to the elderly in a
given community designated as a high priority area.
money and authority to perform this function.

It is given the

Moreover, the ability

of the area agency to undertake the linkage service task at the area
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level without the need of involving other organizations serves to
establish their role as unique to them.

Since organizations strive

to maintain their autonomy from others, then the linkage role which
the federal legislation sets for the area agency enhance s the ability
of the agency to demonstrate that it has an identifiable role for itself
which is separate from the rest of the organizations in their particular network.

This role affords them the legitimacy to function in

this capacity.
Recognizing that this may not be enough, that substantially
increased funding alone is not sufficient to provide for the full-range
of services to the elderly, the Area Agencies on Aging are also
charged with the task of lIpooling" untapped re source s on behalf of
the elderly.

This function calls for a mobilizing or advocating role for

the AAA to rnake sure that other service agencies are providing sufficient services to the aging population.
Taken together, area agencies were

conceptualize~

as organ-

izations established explicitly to implement a national goal strategy
through a series of developmental procedural steps.

Funds and

authority are appropriated to the area agencie s specifically to fill in
service gaps, and to mobilize other resources which rnight be available in their more immediate setting.

Consequently, area agencies

becorne organizations established by superordinate actors on whose
support they are totally dependent.

Should the area agency wish to
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break away froITl these constraints, it would be incUITlbent on theITl to
develop support froITl other sources, only then would they be able to
pursue activities not ITlandated by federal or state aging officials.
Area Agencies on Aging are, thus, accountable to their
parent organization - they are charged with certain stipulations on
which they ITlust follow through as a condition for the receipt of funds.
Although certain choices are left open to the area agency, the federal
governITlent has spelled out, in a detailed fashion, the agency's
functions.

They have explicit instructions for allocating the funds

which the federal legislation provides.

Again, this issue has tre-

ITlendous iITlplications for the way in which these organizations interact with other organizations.

Because they put a great eITlphasis on

being accountable to the federal governITlent, they will be less inclined to initiate, or for that ITlatter, participate in interorganizational
acti vitie s.
One of the restrictions placed on the area agency on the use
of these funds is that it ITlust not provide services itself.

Rather

these agencie s lTIust plan for and ove rsee the iITlplelTIentation of
services by other providers.

The following is a list of the kind of

se rvice s as specified by this legislation:
State agencies ITlay award funds to include as part
of the area plan, support for those service prograITls
found necessary, to assist persons, to becoITle
aware of the social services available in the area
(inforlTIati on and refe rral and outreac h se rvice s),
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and support for other social services needed by
older persons but which no public and private
agencies can or will provide. (Federal Register,
1973: p. 28050)
The se re strictions place a specific emphasis on information
about services which are available and the means of gaining access
to them.
purposes.

Only when these are assured can funds be used for other
As organizations which. are solely dependent upon one

source for its resources, they must be responsible to such demands.
Beyond the service areas, remaining funds are to be used for
planning, coordinating, and pooling -in untapped re source s.
is to be done is left quite open.

How thi s

The central purpose of this non-

direct service emphasis is to bring greater resources into the noninstitutionalized older population.

The anticipated consequence,

moreover, of this draw-in or mobilizing function is that it will help
to insure the continuation of programs until federal dollar s cease
(Hudson, 1974).
From this description, it becomes obvious that certain characteristics of the Area Agency on Aging strongly reseITlble those
characteristics of the vertically-oriented organization.

More

specifically, the vertical pattern in its forITlation, the dependency on
the parent organization for the vast supply of resources and with it
the regulations as a condition for the receipt of funds clearly demonstrate the qualities of the AAA as it relates to the vertically-oriented
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organization.

Based on the propositions 3 - 7 as stated earlier, the

anticipated behavior of the AAA will be illustrated in the forthcoming
section.

ANTICIPATING BEHAVIOR OF THE AREA AGENCY ON AGING

Prop-osition 3. Because the vertically-oriented organization is
dependent upon a parent body for virtually all
its resources and is unable to reciprocate fully
it ends up using compliance to the senior IS
wishes.
As mentioned above, the AAA has certain mandates and
stipulations as to how and where the use of funds should be put, and
what sort of activities should be performed.

Given their relatively

weak position in terms of their providers of resources .. they must
comply to these mandates.

Moreover .. because there are two quite

distinct mandates, one calling for filling in service gaps, and the
other for mobilizing resources, it is interesting to note the manner
in which they internalize the demands which the federal government
has placed on them.

As will become evident in the forthcoming dis-

cussion, their compliance with both poses certain constraints on the
organization and their ability to reach their stated goals.
In terms of the linkage role the compliance to these guidelines
is well suited to the agency's situation.

Besides the explicit
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instructions for the allocation of funds, the area agency is also subject to evaluation by the parent organization.

Were it determined

that the age ncy was not functioning according to expectations set out
in the original guidelines, its existence would be threatened.

Be-

cause the federal government controls the flow of funds and legitimacy
(it provides the AAA their uniqueness as separate from other organizations) into the linkage portion of the guidelines, the anticipated behavior of the AAA will be to comply to the government's wishes.
The draw-in role for the AAA (mobilizing resources) is
marked by different characteristics.

There are no dollars attached

to this role as there are the linkage mandate, and as Hudson (1974)
has pointed out, there is little reason for the area agencies to want
to comply to this mandate in combination with the linkage role.

As

mentioned previously, there is an advantage to establishing the linkage function independently of other organizations.

For this to be

combined with the draw-in role would negate their uniqueness provided to the AAA by their linkage function.

Moreover, should the AAA

choose to downplay the draw-in function, they would not leave themselves as open to criticism as would be the case if it chose to downplay the linkage network function

(Hudson, 1974: p. 50).

Despite this reality, there still is a national mandate for this
role on the AAA.

Their inability to reciprocate to the dominant or

parent body places them in a position of having to demonstrate that
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they are willing to work at drawing in additional resources for the
aging population (they end up complying to the senior 1 s wishes), but
knowing at the same time that they run risks in doing so.
clear limits on the kinds of draw-in activities performed.

This sets
Histories

of social grant-in-aid programs indicate that the larger goals which
cooperative efforts were designed to realize frequently fall short
(Hudson, 1974). The underlying factor is the priority given to organizational concerns (their internal survival as it relates to the constraints imposed on them by a central authority) as opposed to the
a ttai nme nt of s uc h goals.

Control of Dep'endency

Prop'osition 4. Because the vertically- oriented organization is
constrained by central authority, they will be
less likely to control dependency through cooperation strategies such as cooptation or
coalition formation.
As stated earlier, the AAA is constrained by central authority
by the fact that the vast bulk of their funds and their legitimation is
controlled by the federal government - they are totally dependent on
that parent body.

Should the agency choose to control this dependency

through cooperation strategies, such as cooptation and coalition formation, they run certain risks.

To reiterate, these risks run from

minor alterations in goals to cooptation by other organizations with
whom it might be dealing.

Moreover, these risks are proportional to
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the disparity between the organization f s strength and that of its
partner, and to the resources which it would contribute.

Area

Agencies are weak organizations in these terms since any joint undertaking would involve too great a drain from their resources.

Put

another way, being that the AAA is a vertically-oriented organization
concerned with their own internal survi val, and that their resources
are central to establishing their organizational integrity, they would
not willingly jeopardize them to entice another organization to join
with them in pursuit of an external goal which can only serve some
Ie s ser organizational purpose.

The reality of the situation, howe ve r,

is that the draw-in function for the AAA would result in entering into
a cooperative venture with other agencies or public bodies where "all
the parties concerned must agree upon an end or a goal toward which
they are working," (Hudson, 1974: p. 50) making for an ambiguous
situation.
As Hudson has illustrated, organizations can minimize their
involvement and vulnerability when taking part in cooperative ventures
by limiting ventures (in the case of the AAA this would mean tapping
marginal resources of their partners or other organizations), and
defining the effort in procedural terms rather than goal terms, thereby participating in a cooperative venture which is highly goal displaced.

This latter point is clearly demonstrated by the greater

rationalization of the program.

Great care is taken in linking
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Title III appropriations and resources presumably available in the
substate planning areas to program objecti ve s whic h will furthe r the
overall legislative goal.
ants, the

lI

By eliminating other behavioral determin-

a bstract-rational ll model around which this program. was

designed, risks the ability to account for a wide variety of
much of which takes place in the name of planning.

a~ti vity

Roland Warren

state s the se lim.itations concisely:
In the abstract-rational m.odel for planning,
the substanti ve aspects are extraneous, rational
calculation is confined to substanti ve aspects,
tends to be organized in discreet units, and is
final state oriented; the action system and the
planning system do not coincide, and the tendency
is toward monastic decision-making.
(Warren (a), 1973: p. 59)
In the course of adapting means to reach organizational goals, the
means may becom.e ends in them.selves that displace the original
goal thereby serving a useful purpose in minimizing the organizational
vulnerability in a cooperative venture.

Legitimization of Goals

Prop-osition 5. Because the ve rticall y- oriented organization
expends much energy on the legitimation of
goals, they lack a concrete planning or action
output - they become dominated by maintenance
needs.
Gi ven the fact that the vertically-oriented organization m.ust
be accountable to that parent body who controls its resources, they
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expend ITluch effort legitiITlizing their goals.

Consequently, they run

the risk of becoITling dOITlinated by their internal survival as opposed
to focusing on change in their external environITlent.

With this in

ITlind, it is anticipated that as the AAA trie s to legitiITlize its linkage
function as well as its draw-in role (one being ITluch less riskier to
COITlply to) in the eyes of the federal governITlent, ITluch energy ITlay
be expended which ITlay affect their ability to create any change in the
environITlent.

They ITlay not be able to work at iITlproving the overall

econoITlic or physical conditions of the elderly.
In terITlS of the study by the Institute on Aging (the Concord
Study), the perception of the AAA by other organizations sheds SOITle
light on this point. More specifically, their perceptions of the changes
in the service cOITlITlunity (see Table II) and the conditions of the elderly
(see Table III) which were the result of the AAA illustrate the possibility that on the one hand the AAA made some changes in terITlS of
filling in certain gaps in the cOITlITlunity, on the other hand, they made
very little difference in terITlS of any overall change for the elderly,
especially any econoITlic change (one of their stated goals).

Put into

the perspective of this analysis, this perception raises the possibility
that the AAA ITlay be exerting a treITlendous amount of energy fulfilling
its linkage task to satisfy its accountability to the federal government,
yet in the process they ITlay be overlOOking the environmental issue at
hand, naITlely the poor econoITlic situation for the elderly.
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TABLE II
ORGANIZATIONAL PERCEPTIONS CONCERNING THE IMPACT
OF THE AREA AGENCY ON AGING ON
THE SERVICE COMMUNITY

Much
Better
Off
Filling of
Gaps in the
Local Service
Sector
Developing
Linkage
Services

Somewhat
Better
Off

No
Different

Somewhat
Worse
Off

Much
Worse
Off

30%

32%

15%

4%

9%

26%

36%

180/c

30/0

8%

TABLE III
ORGANIZATIONAL PERCEPTIONS CONCERNING THE IMPACT
OF THE AREA AGENCY ON AGING ON
THE SERVICE COMMUNITY

Much
Better
Off
Income Financial Condition

Somewhat
Better
Off

No
Different

Somewhat
Worse
Off

Much
Worse
Off

7%

12%

66%

50/c

4%

Pre stige in the
Community

11%

35%

35%

10%

7%

A bility to affect
Political Decisions

14%

30%

35%

5%

10%
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Moreover, this study also illustrated some disastisfaction
among these organizations which again rn.ay have some bearing on the
above stated proposition.

With the exception of planning for old

people, there was no significance (statistically) in what these organizations thought the AAA was supposed to do for old people, government bodies, and local service agencies with what the AAA is actually
doing in the area of planning, direct service and information (see
Appendix A)

Interactions

Prop-osition 6. Because the vertically-oriented organization
becomes dominated by internal concerns, they
are less likely to become involved in intense
interactions (i. e., joint activities) with other
organizations in their functional geographic
community.
In view of the ad vantage s open to the A rea Agencie s on Aging
in concentrating to a larger extent on funding a linkage deli very network, and their vertical-orientation, they will not be as inclined to
involve themselves heavily with other actors (involvement in terms of
j oint programs) and even then it will be only to demonstrate their

compliance with federal regulations.

Efforts made in this area will

tend to be incremental and goal displaced such as outlined above.
Based on the continuum of interdependence as illustrated by
Burton Gummer (1975), the relati vely low level of interdependence
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that the AAA has with other organizations was illustrated by the
responses (taken froITl the Concord Study as discussed above) to the
following questions:
1. In the past year how ITlany tiITles have you collaborated with
the AAA on the forITlulation of prograITls? (See Table IV)
2. In the past ITlonth how ITlany tiITles have you worked jointly on
planning services to specific individuals?

(See Table V)

TABLE IV
FREQUENCY OF COLLABORATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONS
TO THE AREA AGENCY ON AGING

Frequency

NUITlber

Percent (%)

8

14

1-5

24

34

6-20

11

15

7

10

More than 100

1

1

Not Applicable

12

17

Don't Know

2

3

No InforITlation

6

8

None

21-100
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TABLE V
FREQUENCY OF INTENSE:*CONTACTS OF ORGANIZATIONS
TO THE AREA AGENCY ON AGING

Frequency

Number

Percent (o/c)

None

26

37

1-5

10

14

6-20

4

6

21-100

4

6

More than 100

2

3

Not Applicable

15

21

Don't Know

3

4

No Information

7

10

*Intense refers here as involvement with joint activities

As is evident from these results, 37% of those who responded
to question 2 said, in effect, that they had no occasions to work
jOintly with the AAA in the past month.

This points out a strong

possibility that the AAA has little to do with other organizations
serving the elderly in terms of any intense collaboration.

Coordination

Prop-osition 7. Vertically-oriented organizations, because they
are less likely to become involved in jOint pro-
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grams will less likely become involved in
coordi nated efforts with othe r ·organizations.
Based on the relationship between interdependence and coordinated efforts as demonstrated by the previous studie s brought
out in this theoretical discussion, one can speculate as to the ability
of the AAA to become involved in coordinated efforts with other
organizations.

In other words, because the re is a close relationship

with an organization's ability to be involved in joint programs and
its ability to be involved in coordinated efforts with other organizations, then one can expect the AAA to be ineffective in reaching its
stated goal, i. e., to coordinate services for the elderly.

CHAPTER V

IMPLICA TIONS

Although it was not pos sible to empirically test the major
assumption concerning the Area Agency on Aging's effectiveness at
reaching its goals within the breadth of this analysis, the use of the
AAA as case material in support of the contentions with regard to the

vertically- oriented organization has implications in te rms of the
"New Federalist's" strategy (i. e., the emphasis on the strengthening
of horizontal relations through vertical means.) It points out a
critical ambiguity in federal legislation.

On the one hand, the arne nd-

lnents to the Older American Act calIon the area agencies to perform
one role which is essentially administrative; overseeing the development of gap-filling services.

On the other hand, they are charged

with a quite different task: mobilizing resources and making other
planners and service providers more responsi ve to the needs of older
persons.

These two mandates, as is obvious, are quite incompatible.

The federal government has asked the a.rea agencies

to engage

acti vely with other organizations in the area environment with the
performance of the mobilizing function, when they have not been able
to set the terms of their own existence in that environment because of

III

thei r strong vertical ties.

The detailed instructions regarding the

development of the linkage network fosters reliance on the federal
aging structure while m.obilizing resources requires that attention
be concentrated at the area level.
While the original rationale for the area strategy was based
on the need to develop support for aging services at the substate
level, the way in which the Older American Amendments are being
implemented will only serve to reinforce the vertical structure.

This

strategy has attem.pted to depart from. the traditional form.s of federal
control, yet it has not departed from. the investment in the coordination process.

Consequently, it is suggested in this analysis that

this strategy will not be successful mainly because of its am.biguous
nature - it has served to strengthen vertical ties in the com.munity
through the elaboration of planning technology and the proliferation
of federal rubric through coordination while at the sam.e time focusing
on the maintenance of horizontal relations.
As was dem.onstrated by this analysis, the vertical pattern
can be seen as a deliberate rationally planned bureaucratic structure
such as illustrated by the m.ulti-divisional decentralized structure
among the m.ajor corporations as well as the developm.ent of the Area
Agency on Aging.

Whereas, the horizontal pattern in a com.m.unity is

characterized by sentim.ents, inform.ality, lack of planning, and diffuse
structures (Warren, 1963).

Consequently, the norm.s, goals, and
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behavior patterns between the vertical ties and those horizontal ties
in a given community do not coincide.

As Roland Warren (1963) has

pointed out, vertical ties are generally stronger than horizontal
ties among units of any community.

Moreover, the historical analy-

sis of organizations (business, voluntary, and government-controlled
relief-giving organizations) in this perspective illustrated the fact
that vertical ties tend to strengthen as society becomes more complex.

The typical response, however, by the federal government to

this strengthening of vertical ties and the proliferation of reliefgi ving organizations was to try and strengthen horizontal relations
by the creation of coordinating bodies which were rationally planned
bureaucratic structures.

As a result, because of their own survival

in terms of those who control their resources, they will not be likely
to focus on the horizontal relations in the community; they will tend
toward more goal displacing behavior.
Another implication with regard to this analysis has to do
with inter-agency cooperation, and the ability of such an agency as
the Area Agency on Aging to facilitate cooperation among agencies
serving the aging population.

As was demonstrated by this analysis,

the independence of the vertically-oriented organization from the
re st of the community and greater dependence on a system outside
the community causes specific types of disagreements an10ng the
local system.

Moreover, because of the strong vertical ties of the
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Area Agency on Aging, and thus the inability for this organization to
get involved in any intense interaction with other organizations, it
is predicted that it will not enter into a situation with other organizations where this conflict can be aired.

A que stion can be raised,

therefore, as to the Area Agency on Aging's ability to facilitate cooperation when it is unable to enter into a cooperative situation because of its internal as well as its external structure.
With this in mind, it is the hope of this analysis that future
enquiry into this relatively untouched area will be made.

More

specifically, it is recommended that research be made which focuses
on the New Federalist's strategy and its attempt to strengthen
horizontal relations through vertical means.

Using the variables

dependency /interdependency and frequency of interactions, as was
used in the context of this analysis, offers a theoretical base for
such enquiry, and a point of departure for future developments in
the area of the vertically-oriented organization.
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APPENDIX

A.

Organizational re sponse s to perceived objecti ve s of
AAA to do planning for old pe ople in relation to
accomplishment of planning objectives by the AAA.
Re sponse: The AAA is doing planning

Response: The AAA is supposed to do planning
for old people

No

Yes

Yes

16

25

No

18

24

Chi Square = 4. 4625
x

B.

2

>

3.84*

Organizational responses to percei ved objective s of
the AAA to do planning for local service agencies in
relation to the accomplishment of planning objecti ves.
\

Response: The AAA is doing planning
No
Response: The AAA is supposed to do planning
for local service
agenices

Yes
No

9

23

13

27

Chi Square = • 06063
2
x <. 3. 84**

;~Significant

at . 05 level

**N ot significant at . 05 level

Yes
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c.

Organizational response to perceived objectives of
the AAA to do planning for government bodie s in
relation to the accomplishment of planning objectives
by the AAA.
Response: The AAA is doing planning
No
Response: The AAA is doing
planning for Government bodie s.

Yes
No

Chi Square
x

D.

Yes

4

22

16

26

= 3.98950

2 > 3. 84*

Organizational responses to perceived objectives of
the AAA to provide direct service for old people in
relation to the accomplishment of direct service
objectives by the AAA.
Re sponse: The AAA is providing
direct service

Response: The AAA is supposed
to provide direct
services to old
people

No

Yes

Yes

17

11

No

30

15

Chi Square

= . 26669

x

*Significant at . 05 level
**N ot significant at . 05 level

2

L

3. 84**

121

E.

Organizational responses to perceived objectives of
the AAA to provide direct services to local service
agencies in relation to the accomplishment of direct
service objectives by the AAA.
Response: The AAA is actually providing direct services
No
Response: The AAA is sup14
Yes
posed to provide
direct service to
34
No
local se rvice
agencies.
Chi Square = • 57200
x

F.

2

<

Yes

5

19

3. 84**

Organizational responses to percei ved objectives of
the AAA to provide direct services to government
bodies in relation to the acc omplishment of direct
service objectives by the AAA.
Response: The AAA is providing
direct service s

Response: The AAA is supposed to provide
direct services to
government bodies

Yes
No
Chi Square
x

*Significant at . 05 level
**Not significant at . 05 level

2

<

== •

No

Yes

5

3

40

20

05475

3.84**

122

G.

Organizational responses to perceived objectives of
the AAA to provide information to old people in
relation to the accomplishment of information providing objectives by the AAA.
Response: The AAA is providing
information
Response: The AAA is supposed
Yes
to provide information to old
No
people.
Chi Square
x2(

H.

No

Yes

13

14

24

22

= • 11032

3.84**

Organizational responses to perceived objectives of
the AAA to provide information to local service
agencies in relation to the accom.plishm.ent of
inform.ation providing objectives by the AAA.
Response: The AAA is providing
services

Response: The AAA is supposed
to provide inform.ation to local service
agencies.

No

Yes

Yes

13

21

No

23

15

Chi Square

= 3.57

2
x <::;. 3. 84**

*Significant at . 05 level
**Not significant at .05 level

